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Saturday, 2 May 2015

The field of fashion production in Milan: A theoretical discussion and an empirical investigation

The field of fashion production in Milan: A theoretical discussion and an empirical investigation


Highlights

Bourdieu's concept of field of cultural production is proposed to explore strategies of fashion entrepreneurs.
A theoretical discussion shows that this concept is complementary to that of networks or Becker's world of art.
Empirically the concept is applied to emerging fashion designers in Milan.
The notion of field enriches our understanding of local organisation of fashion entrepreneurs.

Abstract

The paper looks at the fashion industry in Milan, where, as in other cultural industries, entrepreneurs and professionals rely on their networks for the exchange of information, the building of reputation, accessing critical resources and many other crucial activities. Recently, research has been done about how actors access networks, emphasising the role of social and cultural capital, stressing how inequalities are reproduced and highlighting dynamics of exclusion. What is less explored are actors' strategies to exploit the potential of networking. With this aim, the paper investigates the dynamic positioning of fashion professionals in the fashion system of Milan by using Bourdieu's concept of field of cultural production. Key questions concern actors' strategy in using and combining their social, cultural and economic capital in order to gain better positioning in the system and therefore gain success. In depth interviews and histories of professional life of fashion designers constitute the basis of the empirical investigation. Empirical results show that the notion of field enriches our understanding of local organisation of creative workers.

Keywords

  • Bourdieu;
  • Fashion industry;
  • Network;
  • Social capital;
  • Field of cultural production;
  • Milan

Functions of networks within the creative economy

In the 1970s Becker paved the way to the study of cultural production, illustrating that artistic work is the product of collaboration and of a complex division of labour among many different people: art is social in character, as well as knowledge, innovation, creativity and culture which are grounded on a large social base.
The local organisation of creative workers has been described as creative communities (Scott, 2000) or, more generally, place-based networks of relations. The basic theoretical assumption recalls Becker's idea that culture is a social phenomenon and a social construct, and cultural or artistic forms are comprehensible only in terms of a wider system of human relationships (Scott, pp. 30–31).
Local networks represent the environment where social relations develop. A large body of literature flourished in particular at the turn of the twentieth-first century, focused on face-to-face interactions, co-presence and proximity and showed that, notwithstanding improvements in mobility and communication, people have to meet in person and face-to-face interactions and physical proximity still matter.
Information exchange, knowledge (re)production, organisation of work, developing of trust and recognition (of talent) are the main functions which the literature agrees to be accomplished by interaction within networks (Banks, 2000, Menger, 2009, Molotch, 2002, Molotch, 2003 and Pratt, 2000). Therefore being into such networks, or, as Storper and Venables put it, being into the loop ( Storper & Venables, 2004), is crucial for the success of creative professionals. Recent research has been done about how actors access networks, emphasising the role of social and cultural capital, stressing how inequalities are reproduced and highlighting dynamics of exclusion ( Ashton, 2013, Freire-Gibb, Nielsen, 2014, Grugulis, Stoyanova, 2012 and Lee, 2011).
In previous researches on the fashion professionals in Milan and in London (d'Ovidio, 2010), the importance and functions of networks among fashion operators have been deeply analysed. Those results confirmed the general outcome of researches in the creative industry, and they proved the importance of developing and maintaining social relations for fashion designers. It is by being connected with other people that they do business, solve problems and acquire information, visibility and recognition as they build their reputation. Through social relations, trust is built and collaboration is fostered. As they need to be connected in order to function successfully in their profession, time and energy are constantly invested in networking, in seeing each other and being seen in the “right” places and events.
The paper discusses this literature proposing to frame the action of a sample of fashion entrepreneurs in Milan, Italy, within Bourdieu’s action theory and to analyse their strategy in using and combining their social, cultural and economic capital in order to succeed. We will see that this theoretical framework enhances our understanding of the cultural production as it offers a deeper insight about conflicts among actors, about their competitive strategies and their use of capital. We will also see that such perspective is complementary and not antithetical to the one focusing on networks and local communities.

Accessing the network or exploiting capitals in the field of cultural production?

The large body of work exploring functions and importance of networks focuses on reasons and mechanisms though which networks ease a whole set of tasks; secondly it shows that being inside the network is crucial for talent recognition and reputation; and thirdly, that entering the network implies the use and practice of specific capitals (in particular social and cultural ones) and that not all actors are accessing such networks. Granovetter's legacy is clear: actors' embeddedness refers to the role of concrete personal relations and structures (Granovetter, 1985, p. 490) and the underlying hypothesis is that the more embedded are the actors, the more they are successful. Accessing the network seems thus necessary for the survival of operators within the system, but is it enough for achieving success?
In such literature it is not the degree of actors' embeddedness that is in question, nor the means through which actors become embedded, but the role and functions performed by the relations developing within the network; the density of network and basically the number of contacts which an actor can count on, is assumed as a proxy of success of the functioning of a network for the given actor, without questioning how these contacts have been made, whether they are redundant or not, whether they are effectively conducive to success or not (Blair, 2009).
While studying interactions' functions, networks are often conceived as a “reified” social space, with clear boundaries, where the inside actors win, not focusing enough on how they accessed such space nor what has happened to those who remain outside.1
Moreover, focusing the attention on the functions performed by interactions within networks, the conflictual dimension is often neglected and actors tend to be observed only when collaborating together. As Blair claims, “in looking predominantly within networks to explain their existence research has concentrated on understanding structural features” ( Blair, 2009, p. 118).
Here, a different perspective is offered, that looks at actors' dynamic and relative positioning in the field of production, using the action theory elaborated by Bourdieu. Developing a sociological theory of cultural production, Bourdieu focuses on the relational nature of the field where actors are seen according to their position-taking characteristics (Born, 2010). This point of view is by no means antithetical2 to that of network, but complementary, as it conceives the field of production as a social space where actors are qualitatively and hierarchically positioned. Moreover, if network-thinking allows to understand cooperation and connection among actors, field-thinking also helps to identify and analyse conflict. Of course both cooperation and competition exist in the economic world, in particular with the emergence of the cognitive-cultural economy that requires often a more spatially dispersed but integrated organisation of work (Scott, 2008).
So, key questions concern actors' strategy in using and combining their social, cultural and economic capital in order to gain better positioning in the field and therefore succeed.

An “heretical” use of Bourdieu's notion of field

Bourdieu's action theory aims at overcoming the dualistic idea of agency and structure with a more complex relation between internal drives and external forces which results in the actor practice. The agent owns a set of capitals (economic, cultural and social one) that combine in the social action following two forces: an internal one, namely, the habitus, and an external one, determined by the social space. The habitus is conceived as a subjective predisposition in using one's capitals that agents acquired in their experiences. As Bourdieu himself wrote:
“subjects are active and knowing agents endowed with a practical sense, that is, an acquired system of preferences, of principles of vision and divisions (what is usually called taste), and also a system of durable cognitive structures (which are essentially the product of internalisation of objective structures) and of schemes of actions which orient the perception of the situation and the appropriate response. The habitus is this kind of practical sense for what is to be done in a given situation […].” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 25)
Each agent, owing to a particular set of capitals, acts in a field that is characterised by a specific structure. In The Rules of Art ( Bourdieu, 1996), Bourdieu presents most of the basic definition and uses of the field of cultural production. The field is not only the arena within which the action takes place, it structures the social position where agents' habitus operates; in Bourdieu's words, the field is:
“[…] a network of objective relations (of domination or subordination, of complementarity or antagonism, etc.) between positions […]. Each position is objectively defined by its objective relationship with other positions, or, in other terms, by system of relevant (meaning efficient) proprieties which allow it to be situated in relation to all others in the structure of the global distribution of properties. All positions depend […] on their actual and potential situation in the structure of the field. (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 231)
Bourdieu specifies that in the analysis of an artwork, we must include in the field within which it has been produced, not only the artist, but also the whole set of agents and institutions that contribute to the production of the value and belief of such artwork (not only cultural intermediaries such as critics, curators, journalists, but also the political and administrative institutions as ministers, academies, museums…).
Fields are therefore arenas of struggle in which individuals and organisations compete, consciously and unconsciously, to valorise those forms of capital which they possess (Benson & Neveu, 2005a. p. 4). It consists not only of institutions, organisations, people, but also cultural production, its symbols and its products; the community of creative professionals (the local-based network) is part of the field, but it is not totally superimposed on it. All elements of the field are in the mutual relationship and actors perform in the field with the aim of maintaining, or gaining, power positions.
Conceived in this way, the notion of field provides further insights into the local organisation of actors in the fashion system for the following reasons.
First, it allows to explore how agents make use of their capital (social, economic or cultural one) in order to get better positions (emerge or consolidate) in the field and therefore to take into consideration also conflicts among actors. Bourdieu's approach has been criticised by being too much oriented to the analysis of conflict within the field of cultural production, but not being able to account the transformative power of such conflict in the art sphere. According to Born, Bourdieu offers a frame where to analyse “the antagonistic of position-taking” neglecting the “substantive meaning and power of particular aesthetic formation” (Born, 2010, p. 179). However, if we can agree with Born in the critiques of Bourdieu's approach when he analyses the transformation of the aesthetics in the cultural production, we intend to use such frame exactly in the analysis of competitive positioning of actors, as similarly has been applied to the journalistic field (Benson & Neveu, 2005b).
The field perspective defines the cultural production as a social space and organises it in sub-fields that are in mutual relational positions. Agents position themselves within a field and also within a sub-field based on how they use their capital (social, cultural, economic). Fields and sub-fields are themselves organised as agents within the field, and positioned according to two ordering forces: the market and the culture. The first one, also called heteronomous because it is external to the cultural field, is favourable to those who are dominant on the economic side. The latter is related to the producer of art for art's sake and Bourdieu refers to it as the autonomous force in the field. Bourdieu identifies two main sub-fields in the literary field at the end of the nineteenth century: the small-scale production and the sub-field dominated by the market logic, ranging from the vaudeville or series, to the Acadèmie (institutional consecration) ( Bourdieu, 1996, p. 122).
Once defined as field of cultural production, such social space is considered the environment where actors struggle for their autonomy (from other authors and from other fields) and for recognition. The control of the field is at stake and therefore the entry mechanisms, the rules of field, its aesthetics and so on. Of course what is valid for the field in general is valid for each sub-field, too. In a crucial pass of The Rules of Art, Bourdieu argues: “To define boundaries, defend them and control entries is to defend the established order in the field” ( 1996, 225). Some boundaries have codified rules (such as the need of a particular title or degree), others have more informal entering rules, but if not for that, they are less effective.
Who has the authority within the field is not only able to impose their own world view, ideas and aesthetic, but also has the authority to be recognised. Cerulo interprets the field in terms of struggle for recognition: “each agent is positioned in the field in order to impose his/her principle of dominant view, which means, to struggle in order to be recognised, to be considered by other members, to be noticed, identified” ( Bourdieu & Cerulo, 2010). This reminds us of one of the most important functions of the network, as being in the network means to be recognised and acknowledged as a talented creative professional ( Storper & Venables, 2004). The relational perspective offered by the field notion allows to unfold better the logic of the recognition: it is not only necessary to be “in the loop”, in order to credit or to be credited with talent, but it is necessary to be in a dominant position in the field.
We call “heretical” such use of Bourdieu's concept of field of cultural production for two main reasons. First Bourdieu develops such a concept to “enable the scientific construction of social object” (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 30), therefore to explain the meaning of art or cultural work, while here the concept is used to frame agents' actions and positions and to understand their strategies.
Secondly, the Bourdieusian field is not spatialised, namely, there is no geography in the theory of field and the space is always understood as a social, a spatial space. In this work the field notion is applied to the fashion industry of Milan, taking into consideration agents and institutions based in Milan, following the way paved by Santagata, who used such approach for the artistic field in Turin: such spatialised notion of field helps to specify the elements of a particular localised production system and to analyse the place-based cultural production referring simultaneously to path-dependency elements (e.g. the history of the creative community), to spatial factors, to relational factors, all observed in their mutual connection ( Santagata, 1998).

Local organisation of actors in the field of fashion production in Milan

The paper investigates the dynamic positioning of fashion entrepreneurs in the fashion system of Milan by applying Bourdieu's theory of field of cultural production, in the above explained terms. In depth interviews and histories of professional life of fashion entrepreneurs constitute the basis of the empirical investigation.3
The fashion system has to be conceptualised here as the field of fashion production, such as the social space that comprises fashion producers, producers of value and belief of fashion; the field has its spatial boundaries in the metropolitan area of Milan, Italy.
The aim of the paper is that of framing the action of a sample of fashion entrepreneurs and understanding their strategies (their use of capitals) in order to succeed (obtain better position in the field).
To this purpose, we investigated three main spheres.
The structure of the field of fashion production in Milan and their sub-field: which and how many sub-field constitute the field, and how do agents (fashion entrepreneurs) in the sub-field (re)present or narrate themselves.
How actors enter the (sub-)field, looking at their educational path (their cultural capital), and at their first working (with or even without salary) experience.
Strategies to position-gaining in the field are explored, and agents' actions are observed as the combination of their set of capitals (cultural, social or economic one) performed in order to strengthen their position within the (sub)field, or to gain new positions/obtain better ones.

Field and sub-field of fashion production in Milan

As the field has to be conceived as a social space organised by an external force (the market) and an internal one (the cultural or creative sphere), the work of the fashion designer is always stretched by being creative and being marketable. The fashion system is, indeed, working on a double sense flows: on the one side the economy, managerial and marketing level, on the other one the aesthetic and creative side (Lipovetsky 1987).
Fashion designers are positioned in the field according to the importance they give to creativity vis-à-vis to market and the respective recognition they obtain. Moreover, in our sample, another tension emerges, that between the making of a dress and the designing, or between the quality and the aesthetic.
Therefore, from the interviews we collected, the field can be conceived as structured in two major sub-fields, and a transversal third one. The first subfield includes all well-established fashion designers, responding to and dominated by the market logic, basically the large fashion houses of the Milanese fashion industry (the consolidated sub-field from now on); the second sub-field can be compared with the small-scale production in the literary field (Bourdieu, 1996), and it comprises independent fashion designers, usually young and emerging, proposing creative clothes, experimenting different aesthetics (the independent sub-field). The sub-field of craft-based fashion designers is the transversal sub-field, where we found those who are interested in the quality of their clothes which they make themselves, or whose manufacturing is very carefully organised (the craft-based sub-field).
The self-representation of fashion designers has been the key through which sub-fields have been identified and through which designers have been located in the social space.
Designers of the consolidated sub-field tend to emphasise how fashion is a business; they present themselves as experts of the fashion world.
Emerging fashion designers tend to emphasise their creativity and their unfamiliarity with the real fashion world; they underline how creativity, and not marketing, leads their creations: “I see my job both as a professional project and cultural one. I want to say something, and being autonomous” (int. 1).
Emerging fashion designers aiming at entering the sub-field of established fashion designers usually quote famous designers and refer to their professional careers, presenting themselves as stilista. 4
Stilista is who has a style, imposes his own style; while the designer works exactly at designing something that has been thought by someone else. […] My activity is that of stilista […]. Journalists today want to see the style, and if you do not have it, you're nobody. Not all graduated from a fashion school can be Armani, Dior or Madame Chanel. (int. 20)
Finally fashion designers who are more involved in the artisanal world stress how much they need to work with their hands, and how intellectual is the manual work. They tend to emphasise the poor tailoring experience of people working in the fashion world, and also the superficiality of that world.
Once I saw a collection of night dresses with all fasteners that was sewed wrongly and badly: I had to work 20 hours to fix them, I was the only one able to do it. (int. 22)

Entering the field: education and first (work) experiences

Fashion designers in our sample experienced three different kinds of educational paths: they attended training schools, or design schools, or they are not trained in fashion schools.
The first ones have a strong manual skill and often they chose this kind of schools because “at least I learnt a trade” (int. 24): they tend to be very proud of their technical skills, underlying for instance that “now in the fashion world nobody is able to sew on a button” (int. 24). Most of these fashion designers enter the field, thanks to their cultural capital (their technical skill), with an internship or a job in a small tailor laboratory, or making clothes and selling directly to shops or to friends.
Design schools focus on the creative side, rather than on the making techniques; fashion designers with such an education have a strong competency in imagining a collection, in designing clothes, but they are not trained in making clothes, in designing the patterns and so on.
Among the interviewees, those with a more theoretical and creative education seem to have very clear ideas: they consider themselves as stilista (in the aforementioned terms), they aspire to have recognition and to be well positioned in the field.
Fashion entrepreneurs with a technical education have generally less clear images about their careers, although some strive for the recognition from the fashion establishment.
Those who came in the fashion industry without a specific education stress that they became designers “by chance” and they recall often the role of some particular person, so as to emphasise their social capital, but also they tend to emphasise that “creativity is something that needs to be satisfied” (int. 16).
For all interviewees the first encounter with the fashion world is not the first job: during school they participate in fashion events or even in fashion shows, or they work (as internship) with tailors, or again they have some proto-working experiences with friends.
As for instance: “I made hats just for fun and by chance they have been shot by a Vogue photographer” (int. 9) or “I used to sew clothes and sell them in small markets (or to friends)” (int. 25; int. 14), “with the school I participated at the Toronto fashion show” (int. 19).
The first job is linked to school, too: all those who came from a school (either theoretical or technical) have an experience in a fashion house as an internship. Internships are rather variegated and their stint can be up to two years long, or very short (even less than 6 months). They are generally not paid and the exploitation of young designers is very intense (McRobbie, 1998). After the internship they either stay in the company for a long or short period of time and then they open their own companies.
The ones without a fashion-related education usually “evolve” from an embryonic and informal phase where they make dresses for themselves and for friends, towards a more consolidated or formal stage where they formalise their company, they sell to shops or to private customers.
I made 10 dresses and brought them to the neighbour playground and sold them immediately to friends; then I made 30 and sold them, and finally 50. After some months I made a small sample case and brought to shops. (int. 16)
Once starting to confront the field, fashion designers have to survive on their job, and to be recognised as such. The two forces leading the field of fashion production (the market and the culture, or in simpler words, earning one's bread and butter and being addressed as a fashion designer) are not always connected.
The cultural recognition in the field is performed by a number of cultural intermediaries that, in this case, act as gatekeepers. Accepting new clients is, for a multi-brand shop, a showroom or a buyer, both an acknowledgement of the designers' talent, and also a test of the intermediary capacity in recognising talent. The same can be said for a journalist or a magazine, or for a fair or a catwalk. Therefore, cultural intermediaries tend to be very cautious when they give their recognition.
I had the chance of being selected by a showroom: they are very important, very good and they help me to mature. (int. 9)
Vogue event and The Corner has been essential for our visibility. (int.17)
Press and buyer acknowledgment is important for us, because we know that there are people interested in inserting our collection into their shops, and photographers willing to shoot us, journalist to review us and so on. (int. 3)
In fashion fairs it is not only important to be accepted (everyone able to pay the fee is indeed welcome), but to be assigned a good position, as it emerges from the experiences of these designers: “It was a terrible fair, they assigned us a dump” (int. 18); “That fair was completely useless, it cost, but nobody saw us” (int. 20). Also awards and competitions are essential to enter the field and be recognised.
With the winter collection I won an award that allowed me to a Paris catwalk, Who's next, that is very large and important, I hope it will open me opportunities. (int. 20)
Designers enter the field not only by cultural intermediaries, but also by obtaining recognition by the market, namely, by selling their creations: opening a shop (or a workshop) and selling directly to customers, or selling to shops, or having agents or showrooms.
I personally go to shop owners to show my clothes: I put ten/twenty dresses in a suitcase and go to present them. Sometime they order, sometime they don't. (int. 15).
Obtaining market recognition and surviving is very hard, both because of the harsh competition and because of the high costs that might come. Indeed, of 26 interviewees only 15 are able to live, thanks to their job as fashion designers: the others survive, thanks to their partners, parents, or other jobs.

Strategies in order to strengthen positions or to obtain better ones

Approaching the field and entering it is just the first step for fashion entrepreneurs; they have then to gain a good position into the field.
The strategies aiming at strengthening positions within the fields are different according to the sub-fields and to the one designers might aim, and they are related to the two spheres of recognition, it being the market or the culture (the external force or the internal one to the field).
After the first steps into the field, fashion entrepreneurs have to confront with the making and presenting of their collections as the fashion industry is based on seasonal (six-months) collections, which have to be presented in particular scheduled periods. Even showrooms and shops mostly work in terms of collections. Preparing a collection requires a large amount of resources: time, knowledge, and money. Fashion entrepreneurs depend strongly on their social capital in order to learn and solve many practical problems (find a good fabric, good pattern cutter, deal with administration and so on), but they have to rely on their economic and cultural capitals, too.
Differences occur in terms of education, because those who came from a training school can use their cultural capital and make the collection themselves, while those without technical skills have to convert their economic capital into competencies (namely pay someone else to make their collection), but, conversely, they have more competences in terms of conceiving and designing an entire collection. Also social capital has to be converted into an economic one if investors are to be found.
It's very difficult to have loans from banks. Access to credit is much easier for employees rather than to a self-employed. (int. 20)
[talking about an investor] we met some time ago and one day he told me that he had some money to invest in new business and he proposed me to become associate. (int. 25)
Usually fashion entrepreneurs invest a large amount of resources in the first collection, and this is the most delicate stage of their career. If they fail (they do not obtain any recognition by cultural intermediaries nor the market), the risk of bankrupting is very high; otherwise, they might have a small return that can be re-invested in another collection. Most of the interviewees claim that the first four of five collections yield very little returns, so much so that some of them went out of business.
Collections have to be seen, presented and sold: recognition by cultural intermediaries and the market is even more difficult at a later stage than at the very beginning, when designers can count on their freshness in the field. Moreover, sub-fields are dominated by powerful designers who want to leave out the “newcomers” in order to secure their powerful positions. So a fashion designer in the emerging sub-field aiming to the established one might try and participate in the main Milanese fashion show, or become a member of the Italian National Chamber of Fashion (the institution that represents the most established and powerful fashion designers in Italy). On their side, the established fashion designers will protect themselves and their position by securing the access to the field only to those who have a large economic and social capital:
“it's very expensive to participate to the fashion show, and then you have to pass a selection” … “I've asked to become member of the Italian Fashion Council, but after they saw my CV and turnover they refused.” (int. 20).
Similarly, the recognition from the cultural intermediaries is difficult because they, too, have to protect their reputation and their position in the field. On the one side they have to look for something new and fresh every day, on the other they have to guarantee a good return in terms of money:
All fairs and fashion magazines today pay attention to advertisers, to those who have more money to spend […] fashion magazine has the problem of inserting something innovative between D&G and Calzedonia. (int. 14)

Conclusions

The general question that gave rise to such empirical investigation concerned how fashion entrepreneurs enter their network of relations and whether entering the network is enough to succeed. Applying Bourdieu's action theory situated within the field of cultural production, we aimed at giving an answer to such a question framing the action of a sample of fashion entrepreneurs in the fashion field of Milan. The first emerging element is that, posing in this way, the question is misleading, and a better one concerns how do fashion entrepreneurs enter the field of fashion production and how do they consolidate their positions. Within the field, one's network is conceived as the social space where social capital is built and used.
Entering the field means being recognised by the forces that regulate the field, namely, the market and the cultural sphere. To consolidate their position fashion entrepreneurs have to tackle the rapid succession of collections, which the fashion field is organised on. Here the whole set of capital owned by the fashion entrepreneurs is at stake as well as the capacity of the business to survive. The system is extremely competitive: only fashion designers with a large set of capitals are able to survive, but, more importantly, mainly those with a large amount of economic capital succeed, because awards and cultural acknowledgements are not necessarily enough to assure the market success; moreover the formal financial system and formal collective actors (The National Chamber for Italian Fashion, Chamber of Commerce, trade associations) seem not interested in supporting at large emerging fashion designers. Social capital has proven to be equally important, in particular when able to be converted to economic capital. The emerging picture is that of a very close system that aims to secure the established and powerful actors and to reproduce itself over time. Cultural intermediaries seem dependent on powerful actors in the field, and therefore reproducing the system, but more close attention should be paid to that sphere with specific research programmes.
This perspective revealed to be very productive because not only does it give the possibility of understanding the complexity of the fashion system, but it also allows to relatively position the actors within the fields and sub-fields according to capitals and strategies. Moreover the concept of field allows to address conflicts that constantly emerge between the dominant actors and the new-comers struggling for their recognition. More attention should be paid to other actors in the field: institutions, cultural intermediaries, and consolidated fashion designers, in order to better acknowledge also their strategies.
Such perspective is extremely interesting also because it helps thinking differently about policies supporting creative sectors in cities, as, for instance, the fashion industry. Indeed, a crucial element is, for instance, the field degree of openness to external influences: a field dominated by actors willing to accept newcomers will be more easily a field open to cultural innovation and, therefore, more innovative, although maybe with actors owing few economic capital. On the contrary, a field dominated by economically powerful actors, tend to be close to the emerging ones and to cultural innovation: it risks, on the long run, to loose the international competition based on novelty and creativity. An articulated and complex research programme, offering a complete picture of the field, has innovative chances firstly because it allows a deep understanding of the cultural production, secondly as a powerful tool in suggesting urban policies that are efficient, situated and able to respond to the needs of all actors in the field.

In Conservative budget, sexism and spending work hand in glove

http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/toby-sanger/2015/05/conservative-budget-sexism-and-spending-work-hand-glove?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rabble-news+%28rabble.ca+-+News+for+the+rest+of+us%29

Sectors of the economy where women form a larger share of the workforce -- health care, education, and social assistance -- are almost completely ignored, as they have been for many years.

CHAPTER 3 – Ethnoveterinary Medicine: Potential Solutions for Large-Scale Problems? Cheryl Lans, Tonya E. Khan, Marina Martin Curran, Constance M. McCorkle*

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B978032302998850007X

http://citations.springer.com/item?doi=10.1007/BF02217297

Sierra Club Post - Eat, Paddle, Dance

Eat, Paddle, Dance!

Last Modified: Apr 30, 2015
Do you remember where you were on June 17 of last year?
That was the day that, despite 98% of all public testimony to the National Energy Board hearings, opinion polls showing a consistent 2/3 majority opposed, and the threat of multiple lawsuits, the federal government went ahead and approved the Northern Gateway pipeline and tankers project, pushing an unwanted project on an unwilling province.
So what if we helped them celebrate that terrible day with a groundswell of grassroots fundraising events that together raised big money for First Nations to stop it in the courts?
Now that’s a story we want told, so we’ve decided to make June 13-21 the Week to End Enbridge.
It’s cheeky, it’s coming up soon, but after talking about it over the last few weeks we’re very excited to make it the focus for Phase 2 of your Pull Together campaign.
And because Pull Together has always been about fun, we’re making it easy to engage.
EAT! PADDLE! DANCE!
From small private brunches or BBQ’s with close friends, to getting out on the water in a canoe, kayak, or for a swim, to renting a community centre for a big party or throwing a small one at home, the only limit to what you can do is your own imagination. As long as your event mentions Pull Together and you send in the funds you’re part of the movement!
In 2014 we had 3,000 individual donors, almost 150 online fundraisers, more than 80 events, and 40 businesses all pulling together for a common cause. If we can match those numbers this spring we’ll hit our target and send an even more powerful message, while fully funding up seven First Nations for their battles in court later in the year.
Our goal for the Week to End Enbridge is to encourage communities across the province to organize fundraising events for Pull Together.
We have a new toolkit on the Pull Together website and talented organizers on staff to help you with inspiration, tips, with promoting your event, and telling your story after.  Please email us at outreach@sierraclub.bc.ca for support, encouragement or just to let us know about your event.
Join us and show the federal government the strength of the opposition in this province and the power of our solidarity.
Or in the words of Peter Lantin, President of the Council of the Haida Nation:
“What’s happening here is just an unbelievable level of support. What blows my mind is the scale. Where it can go and where it could end up is unprecedented. I’m blown away by the momentum of what Pull Together is going to build for us.

Friday, 1 May 2015

Bridging science and community knowledge? The complicating role of natural variability in perceptions of climate change

Volume 32, May 2015, Pages 1–10

Bridging science and community knowledge? The complicating role of natural variability in perceptions of climate change


Highlights

Perception of variability presents a challenge to social science of climate research.
Treatment of variability in social science research remains limited.
Excluding variability complicates the synthesis of climate perceptions/observations.
An example is presented for rural Newfoundland (Canada).
Understanding of variability perception can improve climate communication efforts.

Abstract

Although the spatial and temporal scales on which climate varies is a prominent aspect of climate research in the natural sciences, its treatment in the social sciences remains relatively underdeveloped. The result is limited understanding of the public's capacity to perceive climate variability as distinct from change, and uncertainty surrounding how and when to best communicate information on variability/change. Ignoring variability in favour of change-focused analyses and language risks significant misrepresentation of public perception and knowledge, and precludes detailed synthesis of data from the social and natural sciences. An example is presented based on a regional comparison of variability-dominated climate observations and change-focused survey data, collected in western Newfoundland (Canada). This region experiences pronounced, slow-varying natural variability, which acted to obscure broader climate trends through the 1980s and 1990s; since the late 1990s, the same variability has amplified apparent change. While survey results confirm residents perceive regional climate change, it is not clear whether respondents distinguish variability from change. This presents uncertainty in the best approach to climate science communication in this region, and raises concern that subsequent variability-driven transient cooling will erode public support for climate action. Parallels are drawn between these regional concerns and similar uncertainty surrounding treatment of variability in discussion of global temperature trends, highlighting variability perception as a significant gap in human dimensions of climate change research.

Keywords

  • Climate change;
  • Perception;
  • Attitudes;
  • Variability;
  • Canada

1. Introduction

In this paper, we argue that an improved understanding of the ways in which natural climate variability shapes perceptions of climate change is integral to understanding the relationship between climate science and local climate knowledge. Climate change scientific knowledge production and public understandings of climate change typically operate at a dual register. The work of producing scientific knowledge about climate change accounts for complexity and uncertainty and operates through the academic conventions of peer review, including the layers of review involved in producing the IPCC reports. By contrast, public understandings of climate change are influenced by often-simplified media representations and political debates, as well as social interactions with family, friends, and co-workers. It is also shaped by personal experiences of living in a particular climate, moderated by the degree to which individuals are affected/impacted by climate variations or anomalies, and ultimately filtered through the fallibility of memory. All of us experience considerable climate variability, from extreme seasonal anomalies associated with phenomena such as El Nino (Changnon, 1999) to slower shifts in climate norms associated with decades-long fluctuations such as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (Mantua and Hare, 2002); however, the degree to which this personal experience informs perception of change remains uncertain.
Media coverage and public communication of climate change science frequently limit discussion of natural variability in order to emphasize core findings regarding change, construct narratives that reduce issue complexity, and/or fit climate change into a “media logic” that emphasizes conflict and drama (Berglez, 2011; also see Anderson, 2009, Boykoff, 2011 and Freudenburg and Muselli, 2010). There is an underlying assumption in this approach to climate science communication that the general public is ill-suited to considerations of variability and uncertainty; however, it also risks misrepresenting the process of scientific knowledge production while exposing climate change consensus to simplistic (and spurious) criticism related to scientific rigour and claims of certainty. We stress that improving our understanding of the public's capacity to perceive and account for variability will facilitate the development of more nuanced (and potentially effective) climate communication strategies that equip the public with the cultural competencies to engage the complexity of climate science and move beyond over-simplified, binary modes of debating this issue. The case is framed around a regional quantitative comparison of the climate record and climate perception data for western Newfoundland, illustrating ways in which excluding analyses of variability can lead to misinterpretation of perception data. Parallels are drawn between concerns on this regional scale and related misconceptions surrounding recent trends in global temperatures.
In the wake of the “climategate” controversy, there has been increased scrutiny of the authority of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as the dominant organization responsible for defining the state of knowledge about climate change (Beck, 2012). Uncertainty and complexity are part of the ongoing work of producing scientific knowledge about climate change. However, this is often lost in communication about climate science in media and political spheres, where discussion of uncertainty is viewed by many non-scientists to undermine the legitimacy of IPCC knowledge claims. We argue for an approach to climate science communication that adequately conveys uncertainty and complexity to the public and policy-makers, and cultivates the necessary cultural competencies for various publics, media-workers and politicians to engage with climate science. Bridging science and community knowledge, while better accounting for natural climate variability, may help avoid the discourse traps created by the unproductive climate consensus vs. sceptic binary that continues to circulate through mass media and political debate.
One way to work towards this model of climate science communication is to devote more attention to the experiential forces that shape public perceptions of climate change and draw connections between cultural and scientific climate change research (Lahsen, 2013). This requires examining and understanding the links between observations or climate change projections and the “local climate knowledge” of communities inhabiting particular environments experiencing a diversity of climate change impacts (Krauss and von Storch, 2012).
An emphasis on integrating uncertainty and complexity into public understandings of climate science implies the need for greater consideration of climate variability, the semi-regular fluctuation of climate about its mean state. Variability is a prominent area of physical climatology research, feeding into studies of climate change attribution (Hasselmann, 1997) and environmental predictability (Barnston et al., 2005). Of growing interest are a number of slow-acting modes of variability that produce an oscillating series of relatively cool and warm periods in affected regions that can persist for several decades. In some cases, the magnitude of these oscillations can be considerably greater than the local impact of long-term climate change, either obscuring or enhancing apparent trends. On global scales, variability has been connected to varying rates of climate trends over different time periods, including the relatively slow surface warming over the past decade (Balmaseda et al., 2013, Foster and Rahmstorf, 2011, Kosaka and Xie, 2013, Meehl et al., 2011, Trenberth and Fasullo, 2013 and Tsonis et al., 2008). This variability represents a significant source of uncertainty in the quantification of climate change, and efforts to assess impacts of climate change at all scales must carefully account for the influence of relevant modes of variability (e.g. Foster and Rahmstorf, 2011).
Variability has received relatively less attention outside of the natural sciences. Although there is abundant literature examining the perception of either climate change or risks associated with climate variability and change, the perception of climate variability itself is rarely addressed explicitly. The issue is addressed indirectly in some social science of climate change research, and a review of relevant literature presents a mixed impression of the public's capacity to distinguish long-term change and variability. Analyses of climate change media coverage confirms that the two are often confused (Boykoff, 2011), and several recent studies suggest public attitudes towards climate change science are significantly impacted by short-term variation in the form of weather (Donner and McDaniels, 2013, Li et al., 2011, Egan and Mullin, 2012 and Hamilton and Stampone, 2013). Other studies indicate that some populations involved in active, regular land use demonstrate an ability to identify climate variability operating over surprisingly long time scales (Riedlinger and Berkes, 2001, Wolf et al., 2013, Crate, 2008, Crate, 2011 and West and Vásquez-León, 2008). Together, these suggest the question of variability perception warrants deeper investigation, and represents a considerable gap in the current body of knowledge regarding human dimensions of climate change.

1.1. Influences on climate change perception and attitudes

In recent years, a growing social science literature has explored the factors shaping public opinion about climate change. Perceptions research has addressed several dimensions, such as whether it is viewed as a problem at all, who is seen to be at risk, who is responsible for addressing the issue, and what should be done about it.
Media treatment has been identified as a prominent influence shaping public perception (Anderson, 2009, Billett, 2010, Boykoff, 2011, Brossard et al., 2004, Carvalho, 2007, Castells, 2009, Dispensa and Brulle, 2003, Freudenburg and Muselli, 2010, Gavin and Marshall, 2011, Young and Dugas, 2011 and Young and Dugas, 2012), framing the issue of climate change and variability in potentially misleading ways. Boykoff (2011) notes that mass media discussions of climate change have consistently blended weather, as a short-term, localized phenomenon, with the larger-scale and longer time-frame changes to the earth's climate. He writes:
When considering how complex processes have been made meaningful in the public arena, discussing the weather as a component of longer-term climate change has been commonplace. Connections made between weather and climate have provided logical bridges that have been crossed many times in media representations up to the present day. (Boykoff, 2011 pp. 42–43)
That is, the media frequently presents variability as a manifestation of change. This body of research also demonstrates that U.S. media constructs a “false balance” between climate change “believers” and “sceptics” by giving disproportionate attention to the minority of scientists that reject the mainstream consensus position that anthropogenic climate change is occurring and requires political action (Boykoff, 2011, Carvalho, 2007 and Freudenburg and Muselli, 2010). This minority emphasises uncertainty in climatological analyses, often by framing climate change as simple variability, likely to reverse in the near future (Freudenburg and Muselli, 2013). Debates about scientific uncertainty are most visible in U.S. media, though this “American model” of climate change news coverage is in evidence elsewhere, including Canada (Young and Dugas, 2011). By contrast, media in many other countries largely adopts the consensus climate position, with debate more likely to centre on which political actors are most responsible and which strategies for mitigation and adaptation are most desirable (Billett, 2010, Brossard et al., 2004, Brulle et al., 2012 and Dispensa and Brulle, 2003).
Other factors of concern include the influence of social actors such as political elites and environmental social movements. Brulle et al. (2012) argue these factors have a greater impact than extreme weather events (i.e. rare, acute manifestations of short-term variability) or direct communication of climate change science. These actors partly contribute to media's influence, through their reliance on mass media as a means of reaching the public. These results reflect the degree to which public opinion in the U.S. has become politically polarized over the past decade (2001–2010; McCright and Dunlap, 2011b). During the early stages of media visibility and public discussion of climate change, perceptions of the reality and seriousness of the issue were not strongly linked to political affiliation. However, as climate change has gained visibility and greater political significance, public opinion has become increasingly aligned with political party affiliation, with Democrats more likely to be climate change “believers” and Republicans more likely to align with climate “sceptics” (with white male conservatives most likely to espouse sceptical views) (McCright and Dunlap, 2011a and McCright and Dunlap, 2011b). According to Dunlap and his co-authors, the long-term trend towards the political polarization of climate change is driven by the organized climate sceptic movement, which solidified and gained prominence following the 1997 Kyoto protocol meetings through the support of American-based conservative think tanks (McCright and Dunlap, 2010 and Dunlap and Jacques, 2013). The language and tactics employed by these groups often frame the concepts of climate variability and natural cycles as alternative explanations for observed shifts, while also emphasizing that scientific uncertainty around the issue implies more research is required before any action is taken. The related topics of variability and uncertainty may consequently themselves become politically charged, as these terms become associated with a sceptical stance on climate change.
Of particular relevance to the current work are recent studies identifying the experience of weather, or short-term variability unrelated to broader climate trends, as a factor influencing climate change attitudes. Focused largely on the U.S., these studies demonstrate that opinions and concerns surrounding climate change are often linked to temperature anomalies on national (Donner and McDaniels, 2013) and/or local scales (Li et al., 2011, Egan and Mullin, 2012 and Hamilton and Stampone, 2013). Results show that climate concerns rise and fall with temperatures, even on daily timescales. While these studies confirm that variability exerts an influence on climate perceptions, the degree to which they reflect an inability to differentiate between climate and weather remains unclear. The day-to-day variations in opinion reported by Li et al. (2011) and Hamilton and Stampone (2013) in particular suggest considerable ambivalence remains towards the subject of climate change, with weather providing a short-lived additional influence on undecided respondents that temporarily shifts the balance of other (largely social) factors contributing to this ambivalence.
Personal experience of long-term climate shifts can also exert an influence as strong or stronger than non-climate factors and short-term variation. Hamilton and Keim (2009) report that public attitudes towards climate change better align with scientific consensus in areas where warming temperatures produce marked visible effects, such as reduced snow days or a shortened snow season. Other studies confirm that perceived experience of climate change is strongly related to perceived climate risks, but caution that not all reported changes are evident in environmental records (e.g. Akerlof et al., 2013). Similarly, Zahran et al. (2006) found that perceived risk of climate change impacts is strongly connected to climate concerns, but that risk perception does not necessarily correlate with quantified risk levels (i.e. perceived risk is not always greater in regions with greatest predicted risk). It is suggested that such disagreements are the result of interpreting climate through the filter of various environmental (e.g. presence of some quantifiable changes) and social factors (e.g. media, political affiliation etc.).
Considerations of climate fluctuations other than ‘change’ (implied to be long-term or permanent) and ‘weather’ (implying variations over hours to 2 weeks) are relatively rare in the climate perceptions literature. However, a handful of studies do explicitly address variability acting over longer timescales, often in relation to climate adaptation research (Thomas et al., 2007, Mertz et al., 2009 and Kassie et al., 2013). This includes treatment of variations between seasons, years, and (occasionally) between decades, respectively referred to as intra-annual, inter-annual, and decadal variability; collectively, these may be referred to as low frequency (long duration) variability, in contrast to the high frequency (short duration) variability associated with weather or extreme events. Unfortunately, low frequency variability is typically handled with less detail and clarity than high frequency variability. Often, it is included only in analyses of climate records presented as a complement to change perception data (e.g. Thomas et al., 2007 and Mertz et al., 2009). When included in perception surveys, it is often limited to intra- or inter-annual variability, leaving perception of decadal variability undeveloped. Survey and interview questions also often focus on changing variability (i.e. whether extremes are becoming larger, or conditions becoming less predictable) as an aspect of ongoing climate change, without treatment of the perception of variability itself (e.g. Kassie et al., 2013). We are unaware of any efforts to assess perception across the full spectrum of climate variability (from weather to decadal-scales).
The suggestion that low frequency variability should be considered in climate perception studies is supported by detailed studies of specific populations, which often indicate a considerable capacity to recognize variability over a large range of time-scales, and distinguish it from long-term change. This is often reported among people actively involved in land use. Prominent examples include detailed recall of past climate anomalies by Inuit populations, which are often used to give context to recent patterns (Riedlinger and Berkes, 2001 and Wolf et al., 2013). Similar recall and comparison is reported by Crate (Crate, 2008 and Crate, 2011) for the Sakha in eastern Siberia. Some land-users demonstrate a greater understanding of landscape impacts of slow-acting variability than related scientific literature. An example are ranchers in Arizona, who have been held responsible for ecological change following settlement of the region; only recently have ecologists and environmental scientists begun to recognize the role precipitation variability has played in these changes, despite the insistence of ranchers that this has been a dominant contributor (West and Vásquez-León, 2008). However, while these studies confirm a capacity for recognizing variability, reported results continue to focus on how change is qualified and interpreted. The result is limited information on the broader understanding of variability, its time scales, and the reach of its local influence by these specific populations. Information on variability perception beyond local scales (national or international level) is even less developed.
Drawing together this body of social science research on climate change, different studies emphasize different key influences on public opinion: media coverage, weather anomalies, environmental change, and cues from politicians or social movements. These different results suggest that, rather than searching for a single main driver, public perceptions of climate change are shaped by the interplay of multiple factors, including direct experience of weather/climate. We further suggest that variability requires more attention than currently given in analyses of climate perception; specifically, consideration of lower frequency variability, on the order of years to decades, is needed. Given the tendency for high frequency variability (e.g. daily weather) to influence climate change concerns, as well as the significant regional influence of many modes of climate variability, this low frequency variability may dominate climate perceptions in some areas. To the degree that support for climate action is dependent on perception of change, this variability then presents a considerable obstacle to risk perception.

Beyond ‘deniers’ and ‘believers’: Towards a map of the politics of climate change

Volume 32, May 2015, Pages 165–174

Beyond ‘deniers’ and ‘believers’: Towards a map of the politics of climate change


Highlights

Categories in climate politics debate are hangovers from climate science debates.
Existing frameworks in climate politology are critically reviewed.
A new map of climate politics beyond the scientific debate is offered.
Two dimensions are proposed: wicked/tame problem and individual/collective solutions.
Aims to defuse politicisation of science and re-politicise climate policy choices.

Abstract

The politics of climate change is not concerned solely with rival scientific claims about global warming but also with how best to govern the climate. Despite this, categories in climate politics remain caught up in the concepts of the ‘science wars’, rarely progressing far beyond the denier/believer-dichotomy. This article aims to nudge climate politics beyond the polarized scientific debates while also counteracting the de-politicisation that comes from assuming scientific claims lead directly to certain policies. First existing typologies of climate political positions are reviewed. Diverse contributions make up an emerging field of ‘climate politology’ but these tend to reduce climate politics either to views on the science or to products of cultural world-views. Drawing on policy analysis literature, a new approach is outlined, where problem-definitions and solution-framings provide the coordinates for a two-dimensional grid. The degree to which climate change is considered a ‘wicked’ problem on the one hand, and individualist or collectivist ways of understanding political agency on the other, provide a map of climate political positions beyond ‘believers’ vs ‘deniers’.

Keywords

  • Climate change;
  • Discourse;
  • Systems theory;
  • Wicked problems;
  • Cultural theory;
  • Problem-definition

1. Introduction

With its origins in climate science, the issue of climate change has often been considered in ‘narrowly technical and reductionistic terms’ (Demeritt, 2001, p. 312). Until the mid 2000s western media typically reported it ‘as an evenly balanced debate between apparently expert groups who were “believers” or “deniers”’ (Boykoff and Smith, 2010, p. 5) in ‘the science’. This dichotomy, although it never reflected the complexity of the debate, coexists increasingly awkwardly with a much wider debate about what to do about climate change and how to engineer major organisational and societal changes. One observer even suggests that the denier–believer debate is being replaced by a debate about policy: ‘politicians who flatly reject climate science are now being replaced by climate policy sceptics’ (Hickman, 2013). Though ‘denialism’ persists, a great debate on how to govern the climate – what measures to use, precisely what goal to have, how to deal with effects of climate change and which policy instruments to choose – has long been in train. The global climate is not just a scientific object but also a governance-object (Corry, 2010 and Corry, 2013).
Despite this, the vocabulary used to identify climate political stances still rarely goes far beyond ‘sceptic’ and ‘believer’—categories rooted in the debate about the veracity of scientific claims. Introductions to global warming usually side-step the politics, refer to those ‘skeptical’ or ‘supportive’ of the idea that humans are to blame (e.g. Maslin, 2008, p. 35) or only briefly touch on the ‘politics of greenhouse’ (Pittlock, 2009, p. 270). Policy literature typically covers physical climatology, economics and sometimes institutions, without elaborating on how ideologies or political dynamics might influence preferences and choices (e.g. Helm and Hepburn, 2009, Richardson et al., 2011, Stern, 2007 and IPCC, 2001). Studies of public opinion on climate change similarly track attitudes to global warming (e.g. Brechin, 2010) but focus mainly on whether scientific claims are believed and how seriously global warming is viewed (see also Leiserowitz et al., 2006 and Whitmarsh, 2011). More rare is survey data gauging support for specific policies such as taxation on energy and other forms of possible government action on climate change (Leiserowitz, 2006 and Nisbet and Myers, 2007). One report suggested a six-fold division between the alarmed, concerned, cautious, disengaged doubtful and dismissive segments of American society (Maibach et al., 2009). However, this amounts to a more detailed breakdown of the same sceptic–believer continuum, reacting to ‘the science’. Similarly, media studies have looked at how the media frame climate change, e.g. through rival ‘scientific uncertainty’ and ‘climate crisis’-framings (Nisbet, 2009) that also revolve around trust in scientific claims. Others have examined how such framings of climate science play into familiar political cleavages, e.g. between Republicans and Democrats in the US (Boykoff, 2011, McCright and Dunlap, 2011a and Jenkins, 2011).
The politics surrounding the practice of climate science has not been ignored. Science and Technology Studies examines the ‘scientisation’ of climate politics (Demeritt, 2001, Van der Sluijs et al., 1998 and Van der Sluijs et al., 2010) as well as the politicisation of climate science including the role of right wing groups and US-based think tanks contesting scientific claims (Oreskes and Conway, 2010 and Hoggan, 2009, see also McCright and Dunlap, 2011b). International Relations scholars have offered typologies of different diplomatic stances, e.g. being ‘leaders, pushers and laggards’ in relation to a global agreement (Andresen and Agrawala, 2002), have analysed the role of actors such as the EU (e.g. Oberthür and Kelly, 2008 and Bäckstrand and Elgström, 2013) or pointed to factors determining state stances. How do global political economy and national interests affect which states and non-state actors group together behind certain policies (e.g. Newell, 2006, p. 166)? Stripple and Bulkeley (2013) have expanded the purview of the study of international climate politics by collating analyses of governmental techniques designed to govern carbon and populations through regimes of knowledge and Corry (2013) argues that the emergence of the global climate as a governable object has a structuring effect on world politics as a whole.
Nevertheless, despite an ever-widening field, more often than not climate political reporting and analysis is strangely reticent on the variety of positions and the structure of political debate relating to governing climate change (exceptions are covered below). While the denier–believer debate still has serious political implications (see O’Neill and Boykoff, 2010 and Hoffman, 2011), reducing the politics of climate change to this obscures some important issues and leads to a contradiction. On the one hand understanding the politics of climate change with the compass of the scientific debate imports the polarisations of the ‘science wars’ to the policy arena. For some groups, climate change policies are ‘invented by self-interested and unpatriotic scientists and activists’ (McCarthy, 2013, p. 23). At the same time a post-political framing conceals the politics involved, casting climate policy as a ‘global humanitarian cause’ that somehow flows logically from ‘the science’ (Swyngedouw, 2010, p. 217). The paradox of consensus politics coexisting with science wars could thus be two sides of the same coin: ‘the political nature of matters of concern is disavowed to the extent that the facts in themselves are elevated, through a short-circuiting procedure, on to the terrain of the political’ (Swyngedouw, 2010, p. 217, see also Machin, 2013).
This reflects a wider tendency in environmental political commentary to underestimate the ‘ideological and social theoretical underpinnings of the environmental debate’ (Manno, 2004, p. 156). For Hulme ‘disagreements about climate change are as likely to reveal conflicts within and between societies about the ideologies that we carry and promote, as they are to be rooted in contrary readings of the scientific evidence’ (Hulme, 2009, p. 33) and eck argued that ‘climate politics is precisely not about climate but about transforming the basic concepts and institutions of (...) industrial, nation-state modernity’ (Beck, 2010, p. 356). Yet categories and shorthands originating in the science debate continue to signpost positions on climate politics.
This article responds to this problem in three steps. In Section 2 we review existing typologies of positions in the politics of climate change. We ask what categories they offer and identify the key questions they organize their accounts of climate politics around. Bringing these together depicts the emerging field of ‘climate politiology’ and its key challenges. Section 3 prepares the ground for a new map of climate policy positions, indentifying two dimensions relating to problem-definition and solution-framing: how ‘wicked’ the problem is viewed, and the degree to which individualistic/holistic perspectives underpin solution-definitions. A final section briefly assesses the new map in terms of what it tells us about the limits and focus of the existing typologies, what aspects of the politics of climate change have been overlooked by the sceptic–believer dichotomy and how the simultaneous politicisation of science and de-politicisation of policy can be challenged.