Sunday, 30 September 2018

Critical Review of Complementary and Alternative Medicine Use in Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis: Prevalence and Users’ Profile, Decision-Making, Information Seeking, and Disclosure in the Face of a Lack of Efficacy

Neurodegenerative Diseases Review Adams J.a · Lee M.b · Peng W.a Author affiliations Keywords: Amyotrophic lateral sclerosisComplementary and alternative medicineReviewPrevalenceDecision-makingInformation seekingDisclosure Neurodegener Dis 2018;18:225–232 Abstract Get article FullText PDF Login / Register Abstract Background: Despite a lack of evidence of clinical efficacy for complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) use in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), these medicines remain popular around the world. Objective: To examine the prevalence and cost of CAM use in ALS and CAM users’ profile, decision-making, information seeking, and disclosure among ALS patients. Methods: A comprehensive literature search was conducted of MEDLINE, CINAHL/SCOPUS, and AMED databases from their inception to April 2018. This review followed PRISMA guidelines and employed a quality scoring system to assess the included papers. Results: Seven papers met the inclusion criteria and were thematically analysed. ALS patients utilized a range of CAM therapies and/or products, with acupuncture and vitamins being the most frequently reported. CAM modalities were often employed concurrently with conventional medications throughout the disease process. Although some ALS patients reported positive experience regarding CAM use, many were reluctant to disclose their CAM use to their clinicians. Research focusing on CAM use in ALS remains ad hoc and restricted to only a few countries. The rigour and quality of this research field to date has been varied, predominantly drawing upon regional/localized data and failing to report CAM users’ characteristics. Conclusion: A proportion of ALS patients report utilizing CAM concurrently with conventional treatments. Such use, set amidst a dearth of evidence for the efficacy of CAM in ALS, poses potential direct and indirect risks to patient care, and medical providers should be mindful of and enquire about CAM use when treating ALS patients. © 2018 S. Karger AG, Basel References Kiernan MC, Vucic S, Cheah BC, Turner MR, Eisen A, Hardiman O, Burrell JR, Zoing MC: Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Lancet 2011; 377: 942–955. Chio A, Mora G, Lauria G: Pain in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Lancet Neurol 2017; 16: 144–157. Arthur KC, Calvo A, Price TR, Geiger JT, Chio A, Traynor BJ: Projected increase in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis from 2015 to 2040. Nat Commun 2016; 7: 12408. Gladman M, Zinman L: The economic impact of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis: a systematic review. Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res 2015; 15: 439–450. Connolly S, Galvin M, Hardiman O: End-of-life management in patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Lancet Neurol 2015; 14: 435–442. del Aguila MA, Longstreth WT, McGuire V, Koepsell TD, Van Belle G: Prognosis in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis: a population-based study. Neurology 2003; 60: 813–819. Tsai MJ, Hsu CY, Sheu CC: Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. N Engl J Med 2017; 377: 1602. Wells RE, Phillips RS, Schachter SC, McCarthy EP: Complementary and alternative medicine use among US adults with common neurological conditions. J Neurol 2010; 257: 1822–1831. Yadav V, Bever C Jr, Bowen J, Bowling A, Weinstock-Guttman B, Cameron M, Bourdette D, Gronseth GS, Narayanaswami P: Summary of evidence-based guideline: complementary and alternative medicine in multiple sclerosis: report of the guideline development subcommittee of the American Acad­emy of Neurology. Neurology 2014; 82: 1083–1092. Fox RJ: Complementary and alternative medicine in multiple sclerosis. Neurology 2014; 82:e103–e107. Alves PD, McClelland J, Morris ME: Complementary physical therapies for movement disorders in Parkinson’s disease: a systematic review. Eur J Phys Rehabil Med 2015; 51: 693–704. Adams J, Andrews G, Barnes J, Broom A, Magin P (eds): Traditional, complementary and integrative medicine: an international reader. London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Bedlack RS, Joyce N, Carter GT, Paganoni S, Karam C: Complementary and alternative therapies in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Neurol Clin 2015; 33: 909–936. Moher D, Liberati A, Tetzlaff J, Altman DG; PRISMA Group: Preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses: the PRISMA statement. PLoS Med 2009; 6:e1000097. Adams J, Barbery G, Lui CW: Complementary and alternative medicine use for headache and migraine: a critical review of the literature. Headache 2013; 53: 459–473. Peng W, Adams J, Sibbritt DW, Frawley JE: Critical review of complementary and alternative medicine use in menopause: focus on prevalence, motivation, decision-making, and communication. Menopause 2014; 21: 536–548. Adams J, Lui CW, Sibbritt D, Broom A, Wardle J, Homer C, Beck S: Women’s use of complementary and alternative medicine during pregnancy: a critical review of the literature. Birth 2009; 36: 237–245. Wasner M, Klier H, Borasio GD: The use of alternative medicine by patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. J Neurol Sci 2001; 191: 151–154. Pan W, Chen X, Bao J, Bai Y, Lu H, Wang Q, Liu Y, Yuan C, Li W, Liu Z, Liu J: The use of integrative therapies in patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis in Shanghai, China. Evid Based Complement Alternat Med 2013; 613596. Hanisch F, Skudlarek A, Berndt J, Kornhuber ME: Characteristics of pain in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Brain Behav 2015; 5:e00296. Vardeny O, Bromberg MB: The use of herbal supplements and alternative therapies by patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). J Herb Pharmacother 2005; 5: 23–31. Chen L, Zhang B, Chen R, Tang L, Liu R, Yang Y, Yang Y, Liu X, Ye S, Zhan S, Fan D: Natural history and clinical features of sporadic amyotrophic lateral sclerosis in China. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 2015; 86: 1075–1081. Jefferies KA, Bromberg MB: The role of a clinical pharmacist in a multidisciplinary amyotrophic lateral sclerosis clinic. Amyotroph Lateral Scler 2012; 13: 233–236. Kim S, Chung SE, Lee S, Park J, Choi S, Kim S: Experience of complementary and alternative medicine in patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis and their families: a qualitative study. Amyotroph Lateral Scler Frontotemporal Degener 2016; 17: 191–197. Olsen SA: A review of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) by people with multiple sclerosis. Occup Ther Int 2009; 16: 57–70. Hardiman O: Multidisciplinary care in ALS: expanding the team. Amyotroph Lateral Scler 2012; 13: 165. Karam CY, Paganoni S, Joyce N, Carter GT, Bedlack R: Palliative care issues in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis: an evidenced-based review. Am J Hosp Palliat Care 2016; 33: 84–92. Article / Publication Details First-Page PreviewAbstract of Review Received: June 29, 2018 Accepted: August 15, 2018 Published online: September 24, 2018 Issue release date: Published online first Number of Print Pages: 8 Number of Figures: 1 Number of Tables: 4 ISSN: 1660-2854 (Print) eISSN: 1660-2862 (Online) For additional information: Copyright / Drug Dosage / Disclaimer Copyright: All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be translated into other languages, reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, microcopying, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Drug Dosage: The authors and the publisher have exerted every effort to ensure that drug selection and dosage set forth in this text are in accord with current recommendations and practice at the time of publication. However, in view of ongoing research, changes in government regulations, and the constant flow of information relating to drug therapy and drug reactions, the reader is urged to check the package insert for each drug for any changes in indications and dosage and for added warnings and precautions. This is particularly important when the recommended agent is a new and/or infrequently employed drug. Disclaimer: The statements, opinions and data contained in this publication are solely those of the individual authors and contributors and not of the publishers and the editor(s). The appearance of advertisements or/and product references in the publication is not a warranty, endorsement, or approval of the products or services advertised or of their effectiveness, quality or safety. The publisher and the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content or advertisements. Article Tools Article has an altmetric score of 1 Rightslink Get Permission PubMed PubMed ID Citation Download Add to my Reading List Article Details 2018, Vol.18, No. 4 Published online first previous Article Recommend This Survey 2018 AJE (American Journal Experts) ThinkSCIENCE Psychiatry S. Karger AG

Saturday, 29 September 2018

Gender Sorting and the Glass Ceiling in High-Tech Firms

Roberto M. Fernandez, Santiago Campero, First Published September 7, 2016 Research Article Article information Article has an altmetric score of 3 Free Access Abstract With few exceptions, studies have conceived of the glass ceiling as reflecting internal promotion biases. In this article, the authors argue that glass ceiling patterns can also be the result of external recruitment and hiring processes. Using data on people applying by means of the Internet for jobs at 441 small- and medium-sized high-tech firms, they find evidence that the glass ceiling is produced by both internal and external hiring processes. On the supply side, females are sorted into lower-level job queues than males. On the demand side, screening biases against women also are evident, but a series of “what if” simulations suggest that demand-side screening processes play a comparatively minor role in producing the glass ceiling pattern. These results suggest that bias remediation policies designed to equalize gender differences in hiring chances are likely to be less effective than recruitment and outreach policies designed to improve gender disparities in candidate pools. Keywords glass ceiling, economic inequality, gender inequality, gender discrimination, internal labor markets, hiring processes, recruitment Research aimed at understanding the organizational roots of inequality and stratification has burgeoned. Much of this research is motivated by the desire to suggest organizational policies that can be used to produce more equitable outcomes by gender and race (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993; Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly 2006). Although research on gender inequality in organizational rewards is relatively plentiful (for reviews, see Blau, Brinton, and Grusky 2006; Ridgeway 2011), research has been less clear on the mechanisms that produce these patterns. Clarifying the sources of gender disparities remains a high research priority since the effectiveness of organizational policies seeking to reduce inequality depends vitally on an accurate understanding of the organizational mechanisms that produce inequality in rewards (Bielby 2000; Reskin 2000). In this article, we seek to advance our knowledge of how organizational processes contribute to gender inequality. Specifically, we offer a fresh perspective on the organizational roots of the “glass ceiling,” the phenomenon in which women disappear as one looks up through the levels of the organizational hierarchy. At a theoretical level, we seek to re-orient current understandings of the mechanisms that produce the glass ceiling. While much past research on gender and hierarchy documents that the proportion of women declines as one examines the upper levels of organizations (Ragins, Townsend, and Mattis 1998; Blau et al. 2006), with few exceptions, these studies have conceived of the glass ceiling as reflecting internal promotion biases. Although internal processes are clearly important, we argue that this focus on internal processes is unnecessarily limiting. To the extent that external market competition is gendered, then internally focused studies will not reflect the mechanisms that produce gender stratification and may yield misleading inferences about the nature of the organizational barriers to women’s advancement. We seek to correct this imbalance in the focus of prior research by highlighting the role of hitherto unexamined organizational mechanisms—specifically, external recruitment and hiring processes—and offer empirical evidence on how these processes strongly contribute to producing a glass ceiling pattern. In our view, the glass ceiling describes a vertical form of job sex segregation, and as such can be influenced by the same allocative processes (Petersen and Saporta 2004) that might produce other forms of gender segregation of jobs. Such processes can be both internal—as in promotion practices that allocate individuals to higher levels of the organization—and external, as reflected in hiring patterns. Especially in young, rapidly growing organizations, such external hiring is likely to be occurring at all levels of the organization (Bidwell and Keller 2014). To the degree that organizations depart from the Doeringer and Piore (1971) model of the internal labor market, and higher-level jobs are open to being filled from outside the firm, an internal focus will mis-specify the sets of people at risk for filling job openings, which can yield an incomplete and misleading picture of gender differences in allocation to jobs across the organizational hierarchy. These insights have important policy implications. Existing policies targeting gender biases in internal promotion will not effectively address the gender disparities originating in external recruitment processes. By contrast with policies aimed at ameliorating promotion disparities—for example, changing supervisors’ gender-biased internal assessment processes—external recruitment and hiring processes are often controlled by human resources professionals charged with reaching beyond the organizational boundary. At a minimum, our findings suggest that policy efforts specifically aimed at gender disparities in external recruitment are needed to make progress in overcoming the glass ceiling. Moreover, our data analyses and “what if” simulations of the processes at work in the external hiring interface provide further guidance for designing policies to address the glass ceiling. We show that, by themselves, policies designed to reduce gender discrimination in screening are likely to be of limited help in tackling the problem. By contrast, recruitment policies aimed at producing more gender-equitable candidate pools for jobs at various levels of the hierarchy are likely to pay the biggest dividends in ameliorating the glass ceiling. Hierarchy and Gender Inequality in Rewards The notion of a glass ceiling is a popular metaphor framing numerous studies of gender inequality in both sociology and economics (Morgan 1998; Cotter, Hermsen, Ovadia, and Vanneman 2001; Albrecht, Björklund, and Vroman 2003; Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan 2007; Gorman and Kmec 2009). Whereas these and other studies have reported results consistent with the glass ceiling notion that gender inequality is more severe at the top of the reward distribution (e.g., Cotter et al. 2001), others have found evidence of “sticky floors,” wherein women’s disadvantages are most pronounced at lower levels of the reward hierarchy (e.g., Booth, Francesconi, and Frank 2003; Zeng 2011). Adding to the debate, various definitions and strategies have been used to investigate the phenomenon of the glass ceiling. For example, Cotter et al. (2001), Albrecht et al. (2003), and Arulampalam et al. (2007) studied gender differences in earnings across broad sectors of the labor market. Others examined earnings and levels within particular professions (Kay and Hagan 1995; Tanner, Cockerill, Barnsley, and Williams 1999; Noonan and Corcoran 2004; Gorman and Kmec 2009), labor market sectors (Cohen, Broshak, and Haveman 1998; Barnett, Baron, and Stuart 2000; Storvik and Schone 2008), and specific organizations (Petersen and Saporta 2004: 887–93; Yap and Konrad 2009), as well as within the context of the gender composition of “C-suite” (i.e., CEO, CFO, and other chief function officers) and board-level jobs (Bertrand and Hallock 2001; Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007; Smith, Smith, and Verner 2011, 2013). Although much research explores the relationship between hierarchy and gender inequality in rewards, studies in this area have not always been clear about the mechanisms that produce these patterns. As the phenomenon is likely to be the result of multiple, perhaps competing processes, distinguishing among these mechanisms is a high priority for current research on the glass ceiling. In its original conception (Hymowitz and Schellhardt 1986; Morrison, White, Van Velsor, and Center for Creative Leadership 1987), the glass ceiling was thought to be rooted in the ways employers sorted individuals within organizations. A significant branch of the research has followed this line of reasoning and studied organizational processes affecting women’s advancement within firms. Several studies specifically used the glass ceiling idea when examining gender differences in internal advancement. For example, Kay and Hagan (1995) framed their discussion of female–male differences in promotion to partner in law firms as indicative of there being glass ceilings in these firms. Using data on a large service organization, Petersen and Saporta (2004) looked at female–male differences across a broad range of organizational outcomes, including initial job level, turnover, and wages. The section of their article devoted to examining sex differences in promotion is titled “The Glass Ceiling” (ibid: 887–93). Other organizational studies, too, focused on internal advancement when addressing the glass ceiling (Powell and Butterfield 1994; Kalev 2009; Yap and Konrad 2009). Although we applaud the search for specific organizational mechanisms in this research, we believe there are significant and, to date, unrecognized limitations to this internal focus on gender inequality. Research on internal advancement has made the implicit assumption that jobs at higher levels of the organizational hierarchy are relatively closed to the external labor market, so that the set of people at risk of obtaining jobs is well defined. Depending on the setting, this assumption might be warranted. For example, the federal (DiPrete and Soule 1988; Yamagata, Yeh, Stewman, and Dodge 1997) and California (Barnett’s et al. 2000) bureaucracies are purposely structured along internal labor market lines such that higher-level jobs are sheltered from external competition and entry to the system is restricted to the bottom of the hierarchy. This assumption is also reasonable in the case of the relatively closed market for elite lawyers (Gorman and Kmec 2009). The key feature of these contexts is that the population of those at risk for obtaining jobs can be clearly identified, so that the gender composition of those at risk of filling positions can be compared with the gender of those who ultimately obtain those positions. Concerns arise, however, to the extent that the organizations under study depart from the Doeringer and Piore (1971) model of the internal labor market. If higher-level jobs are typically open to competition from the external labor market, then within-organization studies of promotion will obscure this part of the process.1 Indeed, numerous firm-level studies have questioned whether the internal labor market metaphor is currently (Cappelli 1999; Treble, van Gameren, Bridges, and Barmby 2001; Dohmen, Kriechel, and Pfann 2004), or has ever been (Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994; Baker and Holmstrom 1995; but see Seltzer and Merrett 2000), a faithful depiction of most firms. Moreover, several recent studies have shown that many executive jobs are filled by external hires (Lazear and Oyer 2004; Cappelli and Hamori 2005; Hassink and Russo 2010) and that externally hired managers tend to be better paid than those promoted from within (Harris and Helfat 1997; Bidwell 2011; but see Hassink and Russo 2008). To the degree that both internal and external candidates are in competition for job openings (Bidwell and Keller 2014; Bidwell and Mollick 2014), studies of internal processes will not reflect the actual mechanisms producing gender stratification and may yield misleading inferences on the nature of the organizational barriers to women’s advancement. Failing to take into account that external candidates may be vying for the same openings as internal candidates can lead to a biased assessment of the gender composition of those at risk for filling jobs across levels of the organization (Fernandez and Abraham 2010, 2011). If external market competition is itself gendered, then gender biases in screening candidates entering the firm from the external labor market will also limit women’s organizational achievement. As a consequence, focusing exclusively on internal promotions runs the risk of wrongly attributing a glass ceiling pattern to internal processes when the observed result might instead be caused by external hiring. Indeed, previous work has proposed that females benefit less than men from external labor market transitions (Brett and Stroh 1997; Lyness and Judiesch 1999; but see Gorman and Kmec 2009). Hassink and Russo (2010), too, argued that a “glass door” mechanism exists through which women are excluded from higher level jobs in allocation processes from the external labor market. Evidence also suggests that external hiring alone can produce a glass ceiling pattern of increasing gender disparities at higher levels of the organization (Fernandez and Abraham 2010, 2011). Examining the external labor market interface is even more important when one considers the common argument that hiring is likely to be an important locus of discrimination. As a number of scholars have pointed out (Collinson, Knights, and Collinson 1990; Jencks 1992: 53; Petersen, Saporta, and Seidel 2000: 766; Petersen and Saporta 2004: 859–60), if employers are going to discriminate, they have the most opportunity to do so at the hiring interface (Petersen and Saporta 2004). Among other reasons, in the case of hiring discrimination, a potential complainant is not usually identifiable and available when the person is not hired, and the information on the people in the candidate pool who might have been hired is not easily obtained. Without such information, claims of discrimination are difficult to sustain. Employer audit studies, in which researchers submit fictitious résumés for well-matched candidates of distinct genders, often show evidence of gender-biased screening in hiring (Azmat and Petrongolo 2014). Despite its relevance as a potential source of gender inequality, external hiring across levels of the organization is not thoroughly understood. A major reason for our lack of understanding is the difficulty of obtaining adequate data to address these questions. To separate the internal and external barriers to women’s achievement within the organizational hierarchy, we need to obtain data on how the allocation process differs for males and females across levels of the hierarchy. And to do so requires properly identifying the pool of both internal and external candidates who are at risk of filling jobs across levels of the organization. For each position, we need information on who was competing for the job, who made it through each stage of the process, and who was eventually hired. Even when the focus is broadened to consider external hiring across levels (e.g., Cohen et al. 1998; Dreher and Cox 2000; Hassink and Russo 2010), studies have tended to select on the dependent variable, observing only the survivors of the hiring process (see Fernandez and Weinberg [1997] for a discussion of the logical problems of “start with hire” studies). Allocation studies of lower levels of the organizational hierarchy have demonstrated, however, that making accurate inferences about gender differences requires observing not only those who were hired but also those who were considered and not hired (see Fernandez and Sosa 2005; Petersen and Togstad 2006). With few exceptions,2 extant research has lacked adequate data—either internal or external—to study gender stratification in allocation processes by level of the organization. In this article, we seek to correct this imbalance. In contrast to most previous research, we properly specify the candidate pool—both internal and external—at risk of being hired across levels of the organization. We describe where in the organizational hierarchy gender imbalances in job composition occur and the degree to which those imbalances can be traced to external hiring processes. In contrast to past studies of relatively mature, single-firm hierarchies, we study a sample of small- and medium-sized firms in the high-tech sector of the economy. The organizations studied have relatively flat organizational structures and as such provide a conservative test for studying the glass ceiling. While we find elements of the internal labor market model in this setting, we find little evidence of gender biases in internal processes. The fact that external hiring across levels of the hierarchy is common in this sector provides an excellent window for viewing how external hiring dynamics contribute to the glass ceiling. Bolstering our argument that the internal focus of past research has been limiting, we find evidence of external processes contributing to the glass ceiling. Moreover, our findings suggest that policies addressing gender biases in internal promotion are not likely to be effective remedies to gender disparities in organizational level. We find some evidence of demand-side screening biases, but our results suggest that these processes play a comparatively minor role in producing the glass ceiling pattern. The largest determinant of the glass ceiling is that external candidate pools are themselves gendered, with women composing a lower percentage of the applicant pools for higher-level jobs, but a greater proportion of the pools for the lower-level jobs. Our results point to the importance of recruitment and outreach policies designed to improve gender disparities in the formation of candidate pools. Data and Setting The data for this study come from a sample of 441 small- and medium-sized firms in the technology sector that used a common applicant-tracking system. Firms posted job advertisements—sometimes for multiple openings of the same role—to the system. A few postings occurred in February 2008, but applications for these jobs did not begin to flow into the system until March 2008. We focus our analyses on the 50-month period from March 2008 to April 2012.3 This time frame corresponds to the period of recovery following the Great Recession—the jobs open during the early phase attracted many applications, with a gradual decline in the numbers of applicants in the later phase of the study window (Fernandez and Campero 2014). Applicants for positions applied by way of the company’s website by clicking on links to specific jobs. Short job descriptions and information about the company, but not salary information, were provided when applicants clicked on the links. Candidates could apply directly through companies’ websites or via click-through arrangements with Internet job boards. In addition to these external applications, job applications were recorded from internal candidates. Especially important in light of our focus on gender differences, candidates were asked to voluntarily self-identify their gender and race as a part of the application process.4 Our analyses focuses on 2,718 job openings that were filled during the study period. Of these, 53.9% were located in California, 11.6% were located overseas, 6.9% in New York, and the rest were distributed across various other states, with no other state accounting for more than 3% of the job queues. These openings attracted 251,561 applications, 23,738 of these candidates were interviewed, a total of 6,103 received job offers, and 5,055 were hired. These data were collected into the applicant tracking system and were anonymized before being provided to us for use in this study. For several reasons, the high-tech setting constitutes a strategic research site in which to address questions about the organizational roots of the glass ceiling. First, this sector has been traditionally male dominated (Koput and Gutek 2010) and has allegedly displayed glass ceiling barriers for women’s advancement (Blumenthal 2013). Second, similar to Yakubovich and Lup’s (2006) Internet-based recruitment setting, the highly formalized procedures in this setting mirror the suggestions of a number of scholars (e.g., Nelson and Bridges 1999; Bielby 2000; Reskin and McBrier 2000) about the diversity-enhancing benefits of limiting screeners’ discretion. Although the automated nature of the application process makes it less likely that screeners are explicitly steering candidates toward certain roles at the initial application step (Fernandez and Mors 2008), we conceive of the formation of applicant pools as reflecting both candidates’ job choices and firms’ outreach and recruiting activities. Third, as pointed out by Gorman and Kmec (2009: 1430), one challenge in studying patterns of women’s organizational achievement has been the difficulty of gaining access to data on samples of organizations with comparable hierarchies. The data in this context are well-suited to address this challenge. When using this applicant-tracking system, employers registered job openings as being one of six levels: 1) entry-level (e.g., client service representatives, sales associates, junior software engineers); 2) mid-level (e.g., account executives, client support specialists); 3) experienced (e.g., product managers, systems administrators, software engineers); 4) manager (e.g., directors, brand manager, senior manager); 5) executive (e.g., vice presidents and executive directors); and 6) senior executive (e.g., chief financial officer). As might be expected, these jobs are unevenly distributed across the hierarchy: Level 1 (entry-level) jobs make up 19.3% of the data set, level 2 (39.4%), level 3 (29.1%), level 4 (8.1%), level 5 (3.8%), level 6 (0.3%). (Because only seven jobs were filled at the senior executive level (level 6), we combine levels 5 and 6 in subsequent analyses.) Although employers might judge the level of job openings in their own way, they were asked to classify their jobs in the same relative hierarchy.5 Fourth, job applications to positions at these companies came from a number of sources. Most relevant for our purposes is that many applications to these job openings were from people already employed at the firm, that is, internal candidates. For any particular opening, however, external candidates might also have applied and found themselves in competition with internal candidates. As a consequence, within the limits of the study design (see footnote 5), we were able to properly specify both the internal and the external risk sets for jobs at distinct organizational levels and to measure the extent to which gender differences in level at the point of hire can be traced to both internal and external hiring processes. Last, as previously mentioned, past organizational studies of gender allocation by level (Fernandez and Mors 2008; Fernandez and Abraham 2010, 2011) have lacked controls for candidates’ skills and experience. By contrast, in the current setting we have controls for key information on human capital and other background characteristics. As part of the online application process, applicants’ résumés were parsed to capture their contact information and work experience. Career histories were coded based on dates of employment to obtain the number of years of experience. Applicants were also asked questions about their recruitment source. Distance (measured in air miles) between the location of the job to which the person is applying and the candidates’ home address was automatically calculated and recorded as part of the application process. This step allows us to control for well-known gender differences in commuting patterns (Madden 1981; Fernandez and Su 2004). We also control for the timing of the application (see, e.g., Fernandez and Weinberg 1997) by measuring the number of days between when the job first opened and when the candidate applied for the job. Also important in light of the evidence that jobs are often sex-typed (Correll 2001; Fernandez and Friedrich 2011), employers were asked to classify the job openings into functional areas. Thus, we are able to control for the functional area of the job opening by adding fixed effects for the following job functions: IT/engineering (29.4% of the jobs), production/operations (17.1%), marketing (14.1%), sales (11.5%), client service (8.5%), administration (6.6%), human resources (2.4%), and other (10.3%). Finally, although many candidates did not choose to do so, applicants were asked to voluntarily self-identify their racial background; we include a set of dummy variables for race as controls in the multivariate analyses. We believe these firms’ hiring practices are typical of other small- and medium-sized firms, as many of them use the Internet for recruiting (Autor 2001; Cappelli 2001; Kerka 2001). Our main goal in adopting this empirically grounded, case-study approach is to elucidate the workings of previously understudied external mechanisms that affect gender composition at various levels of the organizational hierarchy. The theoretical significance of this study is that it allows us to observe the operations of a set of processes that are normally hidden from view, especially when compared with extant single organization studies of the internal and external roots of the glass ceiling (e.g., Fernandez and Mors 2008; Fernandez and Abraham 2010, 2011). Analysis We argued that the currently dominant understanding of the glass ceiling as reflecting internal promotion barriers is unnecessarily limiting. To the extent that organizations depart from the internal labor market model (Doeringer and Piore 1971), gender differences in external recruitment might also contribute to gender inequality in organizational rank. We begin by presenting evidence on the degree to which these firms conform to the internal labor market model. Table 1 shows the degree to which external candidates (hereafter, “externals”) are present across four stages of the job allocation process by level of the organization. Broadly consistent with the internal labor market model, the data presented in the first column show that the highest percentage of external hires is found in the lowest rung of these organizations (83.09%), and the lowest percentage of external hires is found in the top tier (57.14%). We would be hard pressed to interpret this pattern as evidence of distinct “ports of entry” at the bottom of the firm, however, since nontrivial percentages of the job openings at each level are filled by externals. Indeed, at all levels of the hierarchy, internal moves account for the minority of jobs filled across these firms. Even at the top level, the clear majority of hires are coming from external sources (57.14%). Other studies, to varying degrees, have found the same pattern of many jobs being externally filled at higher organizational levels for large, mature organizations (Baker et al. 1994; Dohmen et al. 2004; Lazear and Oyer 2004; Hassink and Russo 2010; Bidwell and Keller 2014). These studies, however, observed only the outcome of the hiring process. To understand how the allocation process is structured in organizational hierarchies, we need to observe the set of candidates at risk of obtaining those jobs. Table Table 1. Percentage of External Candidates at Four Stages of the Screening Process, by Organizational Level Table 1. Percentage of External Candidates at Four Stages of the Screening Process, by Organizational Level View larger version Column (4) of Table 1 lists the external/internal composition of the candidates competing for job openings, by level. Irrespective of level, the vast majority—more than 90%—of the candidates considered for these jobs are externals. For each of the subsequent steps—interview, offer, and hire—the percentage of externals decreases compared to the applicant pool for all levels, indicating that internal candidates (hereafter, “internals”) are favored in obtaining access to jobs throughout the screening process (see Figure 1). While screeners are selecting internals at higher rates than externals at all levels, the across-level pattern in Figure 1 indicates an increasing preference for internals as one goes up the levels of these organizations. figure Figure 1. Percentage of External Candidates, by Level and Stage of Screening Process These findings have important implications for our understanding of the external bases of the glass ceiling. Unlike the ideal-typical imagery in the classical model of the internal labor market, internals and externals are in competition for jobs at all levels of these organizations. Although the fan-like pattern in Figure 1 indicates an increasing preference for internals as one rises through the levels, external allocation processes clearly still matter, even at the top of the hierarchy. An exclusively internal focus is especially questionable in this context, in which small- and medium-sized firms are not likely to contain enough people to meet their personnel needs by relying solely on internal promotion processes. These patterns suggest that internally focused studies of gendered promotion barriers are yielding an incomplete, and possibly distorted, view of how gender affects the allocation of people to jobs across organizational levels. Indeed, Table 2 shows a glass ceiling pattern of women disappearing as one ascends the levels of the organization, for both internals and externals. Considering first the hires (cf. columns (1) and (2)), we find that in both cases the percentage of female hires declines approximately 15 points from the lowest (entry-level) to the highest (executive) levels of these organizations. A very similar pattern of declining female representation across levels is evident for job offers as well (cf. columns (4) and (5)). These outcomes clearly show that the external job-matching process alone can produce a glass ceiling result. Table Table 2. Percentage of Female Hires, Job Offers, and Applications—Internal and External—by Organizational Level Table 2. Percentage of Female Hires, Job Offers, and Applications—Internal and External—by Organizational Level View larger version Figure 2 plots the percentage of female candidates for hires and job offers across levels. Two patterns emerge. First, for both internals and externals, the pattern of job offers closely tracks the pattern of hires. The one exception is the case of the internals at the executive level (level 5), for which females are more prevalent among those receiving job offers than among those hired. Second, the lines for both external job offers and hires are always above the lines for internal offers and hires. Females are always more prevalent among external candidates than among internal candidates. Interestingly, however, this external pattern is quite parallel to the internal pattern. Thus, a glass ceiling pattern is emerging on organizational entry for these small- and medium-sized firms. figure Figure 2. Percentage Female, by Organization Level We now consider screeners’ role in producing the glass ceiling pattern shown in Table 2 and Figure 2. We investigate the degree to which males are being allocated to job openings at higher rates than females are across levels of the organizational hierarchy.6 If screeners view males and females as being appropriate for distinct sets of jobs, then hiring agents may bias their hiring decisions against females who are applying for male-typed jobs, and vice versa. Indeed, some scholars (e.g., Cejka and Eagly 1999; Ridgeway 2011) argued that rank is itself gendered, so that higher-level jobs are likely to be male typed. This line of reasoning leads to an expectation that screening disadvantages for women should increase as one goes up organizational levels (Gorman and Kmec 2009). Columns (7) to (9) in Table 2 show the percentage of female job applications by level of the hierarchy for internal and external candidates. If gender-biased screening is present, we would expect a higher prevalence of females in the overall applicant pool relative to the pool of candidates with job offers. Further, if screeners are playing a role in producing the glass ceiling pattern, we would expect the under-selection of females in screening to increase as we move up the organizational hierarchy. Comparing the share of females in the applicant pool (Columns (7) to (9)) with the share of females with job offers (Columns (4) to (6)) shows no evidence of increasing under-selection of females by level, for either internal or external candidates. Next, using multivariate analysis, we analyze gender differences in screening odds. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used to predict the rates of interview and job offer7 across organizational levels. Over all levels, and without controls, males are more likely than females to be interviewed (9.73% compared to 8.69%), receive job offers (2.60% compared to 2.11%), and be hired (2.11% compared to 1.82%). Males applied for jobs that are, on average, one-quarter of a level higher than those for which females applied. Males also have higher mean values for years of work experience and years of management experience when compared with women. Consistent with past research (Madden 1981), females are applying to jobs that are closer to home. Males tend to apply for job openings an average of one month later than do females. Gender differences are also apparent in the application source, with males constituting a higher percentage of internal candidates and referrals, but lower percentages of candidates utilizing external websites or job boards. With respect to race, we see that a higher proportion of males than females did not provide information on their racial background (40.04 compared to 33.37%), and that the percentage of African Americans is higher among females than males (7.40 compared to 4.13%). Table Table 3. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Multivariate Analysis Table 3. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Multivariate Analysis View larger version Finally, Table 3 also shows important gender differences in the pattern of applications by job function. A dramatically higher representation of males than females exists in the candidate pools for IT and engineering jobs (37.63% for males compared to 17.29% for females). In marked contrast, female candidates are more plentiful than males in the candidate pools for administrative (18.60% compared to 4.47%) and human resources functions (6.92% compared to 1.77%). (For a similar pattern, see Fernandez and Friedrich 2011.) It is important to recognize that such “application segregation” (Barbulescu and Bidwell 2013) corresponds to gender-stereotypic images of occupations (Cejka and Eagly 1999). If screeners view males and females as being appropriate for distinct jobs (e.g., Mun 2010), then screeners may further exacerbate and reinforce the initial gender segregation of applicant pools by biasing their interview and hiring decisions against people applying for gender-atypical jobs. Indeed, such gender-typed screening bias has often been found in well-designed audit studies of gender discrimination in the labor market (for a thorough review, see Azmat and Petrongolo 2014). If male-typed jobs tend to be higher in the organizational hierarchy, then gender-biased screening will contribute to the relative absence of women at higher levels of the organization. We explore this possibility by analyzing screeners’ interview decisions. Table 4 reports the results of logistic regression models predicting screeners’ interview decisions. We use logit models with robust errors clustered by candidate to account for those candidates being considered for multiple vacancies. To the degree that hiring agents statistically discriminate on the basis of gender stereotypes, these effects would likely be most evident at the interview stage, when screening is based on paper credentials. We present models of the entire population (Table 4, columns (1) and (2)), as well as models stratified by job function. In light of research suggesting that IT/engineering is male typed (Koput and Gutek 2010), we analyze the screening process for IT/engineering jobs separately (columns (3) and (4)). We also analyze the pooled set of female-typed human resources and administrative jobs (Roos and Manley 1996) (columns (5) and (6)). Finally, we combine the data for the remaining job functions and analyze them separately (columns (7) and (8)). Across all these models, we test for interactions between gender and organizational level, looking specifically for a pattern of increasing bias against women at higher levels of the organization. Table Table 4. Logit Models of Screeners’ Interview Decisions Table 4. Logit Models of Screeners’ Interview Decisions View larger version Considering first the entire sample without controls (Table 4, column (1)), we find the odds ratio for the main effect of being female is slightly greater than 1 (1.0224), but not statistically significant. Internals, however, are 4.4 times more likely to be interviewed than externals, but this effect does not differ for males and females (the 0.99 odds ratio for female × internal interaction term is not statistically different from 1).8 The dummy variables for levels show that compared to level 1, applicants of both genders have significantly higher chances of interview at levels 2 through 4. Finally, the female × level interactions specify the test of whether the female effect at each level is different from the overall female effect. These coefficients provide the key test of whether women are increasingly disadvantaged in screening at higher levels of the organization. Except for level 3, where females are 0.9120 times as likely to be interviewed than entry-level females, no significant level differences exist in the likelihood of females being interviewed as compared to males. In column (2), we repeat the model, adding the control variables listed in Table 3. Although a number of these controls are significantly related to the chances of interview in ways that might be expected (see Appendix Table A.1, column (1)),9 the key results with respect to gender are virtually identical to those in the model without controls. Subsequent columns in Table 4 repeat the analyses for separate job functions. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of logit models predicting the interview rates for the stereotypically male IT/engineering jobs, the context in which gender-biased screening against women is most likely to occur. Here, the coefficient for the main effect of gender shows that females have significantly lower chances of being granted an interview than do males across all levels of the organization (odds ratio = 0.6734). This effect is robust to controls (column (4)) (female/male odds of interview = 0.7047). Similar to models in columns (1) and (2), we find in columns (3) and (4) a strong tendency for internals to be interviewed (odds ratios of 4.00 and 3.53), but the coefficient on the female × internal interaction term reveals that this tendency is not weaker for women. With respect to the key female × job level interactions, we find no evidence of increasing disadvantage as one proceeds upward through the hierarchy. Indeed, for models with and without controls, the interaction with level 4 shows the opposite: chances of interview are significantly higher for females at level 4 than they are for females at level 1. Rather than a glass ceiling, this pattern of results is more consistent with that of a “sticky floor” (Booth et al. 2003; Zeng 2011) wherein gender biases are strongest for the lowest-level jobs. Columns (5) and (6) report the results for the stereotypical female HR and administrative jobs combined (substantively similar results are obtained when the two categories are analyzed separately). In the model without controls (column (5)), we find that, overall, women have better chances of being selected for an interview than do men. This effect becomes statistically insignificant, however, when controls are added to the model (column (6)). With respect to the other organizational levels, we find no evidence of statistically significant female × level interactions. The final two columns of Table 4 present the results for the other job functions considered together. Here, women, overall, have higher chances of being interviewed, and this effect is robust to controls. The lack of significance for the female × internal interaction effects shows that this female advantage does not differ between internals and externals. When examining the key female × level interactions, we find no statistically reliable evidence of an increasing screening disadvantage against women across levels. Moreover, these patterns remain even when we compare women and men who are competing for the same job opening.10 Table 5 reports the results of analyses designed to examine gender differences in job offer rates, conditional on the candidate being interviewed. Overall, we find that at this stage females are less likely than males to receive a job offer. But, here too, we find no statistically reliable evidence that the gender difference in job offer rates varies between internals and externals, or for the various levels of the organization. This finding holds true for models with and without controls (cf. columns (1) and (2) in Table 5). To understand how women fared across both of these steps combined, we re-estimated these models by predicting the job offer rate for the full sample, not conditional on the candidate having been interviewed. Across both stages, we find that females have lower odds of receiving job offers (odds ratio = 0.8587) net of controls, but this gender difference did not vary by internal status or level. Table Table 5. Odds of Job Offer Conditional on Interview Table 5. Odds of Job Offer Conditional on Interview View larger version Table 5, columns (3) and (4), predict job offers for candidates applying to IT/engineering jobs. In contrast with the interview step of the screening process, here we find no evidence of statistically reliable gender differences in job offer rates at any level of the organization. Re-estimating the model for job offer not conditional on interview for IT/engineering jobs, we find that across both stages, the odds ratio for females with controls is 0.8052, but this effect is not statistically reliable (z-value = −1.09). Nor were there any significant female × internal or female × level interactions. Here, too, these results are the same for within-job analyses (estimated with fixed effects for job queues), wherein men and women are in competition for the same job openings. In sum, across these analyses, we find some evidence of gender disparities in screening, but no evidence of screeners’ biases differing significantly by level. Consequently, screening disparities do not contribute to the glass ceiling, through either external or internal screening. If the very notion of high rank is stereotypically male, this notion is not being reflected in these screeners’ actions (cf. Gorman and Kmec 2009). As we reviewed previously, theories emphasizing the role of labor supply factors in hindering women’s organizational advancement argue that men and women pursue different kinds of positions. Although this research is mostly about horizontal segregation of males and females across occupations, to the degree that occupations with distinct gender associations are more prevalent at certain organizational levels, such segregation can also take on a vertical dimension. Table 6 presents important data in this respect, as it includes descriptive information on the percentage of female candidates by level within each job function. Looking down the columns for each of the job functions, the percentage of female candidates is considerably higher in entry-level jobs than the percentage of females seeking executive jobs. Although the decline in female representation across levels is not always smooth,11 a glass ceiling pattern of females disappearing as one goes up levels of the hierarchy appears within each of the functions. Further, looking across the rows of Table 6, we also see evidence of horizontal application segregation: female applicants are underrepresented in the stereotypically male IT/engineering function and overrepresented in administration and human resources jobs. This same pattern is repeated within each level. Together, these patterns suggest that the horizontal and vertical dimensions of gendered application patterns are relatively uncorrelated in these applications. The lack of correlation gives some initial insight into why we did not find demand-side screeners’ decisions for gender-stereotypical job functions significantly contributing to a vertical glass ceiling. Moreover, it suggests that the seeds of the glass ceiling are already evident in the initial candidate pools, even before hiring agents begin the screening process within job function. Table Table 6. Percentage of Female Applications, by Level and Department Table 6. Percentage of Female Applications, by Level and Department View larger version “What If” Simulations To assess the relative contribution of supply- and demand-side factors to the glass ceiling, we perform two sets of policy-relevant “what if” simulations based on our results. Because the processes are largely parallel, we focus on understanding job offer patterns for both internals and externals combined. For simplicity and to help understand the net effects of demand-side screening, we compress the interview and the job offer steps by focusing on job offers, unconditional on interview. We compare, using two kinds of scenarios, the observed gender distribution of job offers at each level. First, we simulate the percentage of female candidates among candidates receiving job offers, assuming no gender disparities at all in job applicant screening at any level. Addressing screening discrimination is currently the focus of most bias-mitigation efforts in organizations (Kalev et al. 2006). This simulation provides a picture of what the distribution of females across organizational levels might look like if we were to eliminate all gender bias in candidate screening processes. The mental experiment in this case corresponds to equalizing the chances of receiving a job offer for males and females; that is, we are fixing the gender odds ratios in the screening models to 1.0. Second, we simulate the gender distribution of job offers assuming screening disparities remain at observed levels, but equalize the gender distribution of the candidate pools by organizational rank. Specifically, for each level of the hierarchy, we set the distribution of females in the candidate pools to the percentage of female candidates across all job levels and use the observed point estimates derived from logistic regression models.12 In the case of the whole population, females represent, on average, 36.25% of the candidates for these jobs (see last row and column of Table 6). This percentage varies considerably by job level, however, from 45.53% for entry-level jobs to 27.57% for executive-level jobs. In this scenario, we fix the percentage of female candidates at 36.25% at each level, in essence redistributing women from job queues at the lower level to the higher level, and then applying the estimated odds ratios for all variables from the appropriate model. Figure 3 shows the simulated results for all candidates across all job functions. The observed gender composition of candidates receiving job offers follows a glass ceiling pattern of decline from 42.38% female composition at the entry level to 27.40% at the executive level. Perhaps surprisingly, full gender parity in screening at every level (scenario 1) would produce a very similar gender composition of the candidates receiving job offers: females would compose 45.53% at entry level, and this representation would decline to 27.57% at the executive level. These analyses suggest that, taken alone, policies that produce gender parity in screening would leave the glass ceiling firmly intact. figure Figure 3. Simulated Percentage of Female Job Offers—All Functions By contrast, scenario 2, which assumes an equal gender composition of the applicant pool at each level, produces a much more equitable gender distribution across organizational levels. At lower levels, fewer females would be present, but these women would be redistributed to higher organizational levels. The 95% confidence interval reveals considerable uncertainty in the estimates as the number of job offers used to estimate the screening odds become thinner at the higher levels of the hierarchy; but given these analyses, the most likely outcome is a considerably flatter distribution of women across all levels of these organizations. Next, using the same estimation strategy, we consider the case of IT/engineering jobs.13 Here, too, we simulated two scenarios (see Figure 4). The observed gender composition of candidates receiving offers for these jobs is highly male dominated. Further, the absence of females among those receiving offers for IT/engineering jobs becomes significantly more pronounced as one moves up the levels of the hierarchy: from 18.04% female at the entry level to 9.38% at the executive level. The results of scenario 1 suggest that for jobs at the three lower organizational levels, screening disparities play an important role in accounting for the absence of women with job offers. Eliminating screening bias in the competition for jobs at these levels would lead to an increase in female representation of between 6 and 8 percentage points. This increase is considerable given that on average females constitute only 13.4% of the candidates receiving job offers at these levels. The results of scenario 1 also suggest, however, that eliminating screening bias would have virtually no effect on the gender composition of candidates receiving job offers at the highest two levels. figure Figure 4. Simulated Percentage of Female Job Offers—IT/engineering With respect to scenario 2, the simulated line is very close to the observed line for the bottom levels of jobs. Thus, changing the gender supply of candidates alone would do nothing to address the decline in female representation across these three levels. At higher organizational levels, the results of scenario 2 suggest that the decline in female prevalence is driven by the relatively low percentage of females present in the applicant pools for these jobs. Here, too, the small number of females in applicant pools for upper-level IT/engineering jobs makes our estimates of their screening odds quite imprecise. The point estimates produced in scenario 2, however, suggest at a minimum that the absence of females in applicant pools to senior IT/engineering jobs is a bigger contributor to the glass ceiling in these fields than is biased screening. One final point with respect to the scenario 2 simulations is in order. As previously mentioned, setting the female representation in the applicant pools to the percentage of females across all jobs—36.68% for all job functions and 20.72% for IT/engineering jobs—in essence redistributes female candidates from lower-level job queues to higher-level queues while leaving the overall supply of female candidates constant. Although this redistribution eliminates the downward-sloping glass ceiling pattern in Figure 3, consider that the composition of females in these candidate pools is starting from a relatively low percentage. This condition is especially true in the case of the IT/engineering jobs. It is worth considering what would happen if the overall supply of female candidates were to increase, for example, as a result of outreach policies designed to attract more women to the high-tech sector overall, or into engineering jobs in particular. Our results imply that, ceteris paribus, these policies would have the effect of shifting the scenario 2 lines vertically upward across the board. Of course, demand-side screeners’ biases against women might also attenuate if such an overall rise in female representation were to be achieved. But at that point we are beyond the limits of the insights that might be gleaned from these simulations. Conclusion In this article, we offer a fresh perspective on the organizational roots of the glass ceiling. We suggest that past understandings of the phenomenon as reflecting internal promotion biases are unnecessarily limiting. We argue that many jobs are filled through external hiring, even at higher levels of the organization. To the extent that external processes are gendered, then internally focused studies can yield an incomplete and misleading picture of the organizational barriers to women’s advancement. For this reason, our research has highlighted the role of external recruitment and hiring processes. Using data gathered from 441 small- and medium-sized high-tech firms, we offer empirical evidence on how external processes strongly contribute to producing a glass ceiling pattern. Across levels of these firms’ hierarchies, we find some evidence of demand-side screening biases against women, but these disparities do not differ by level of the organization, and thus do not account for the increasing absence of females at the top levels of these organizations. Instead, we find that supply-side processes that lead to the formation of applicant pools at separate levels of the hierarchy play a powerful role in producing the glass ceiling. Gender disparities on the supply side may partly reflect the legacy of male-typing in the high-tech industry (Koput and Gutek 2010), in which relatively few females had opportunities to gain the necessary experience to pursue jobs at higher organizational levels. Our findings suggest, however, that efforts aimed at increasing the supply of female candidates—both by individual firms and industry-wide—may pay greater dividends than would efforts to address gender bias in screening. Although other researchers have also found a reliance on external hiring across levels of the organization, such external processes are especially relevant in the context of these young, rapidly growing high-tech organizations. Several studies of large, mature organizations have also found gendered external recruitment processes. Our study is the first, however, to document a glass ceiling being formed through the early influx of new personnel. These small firms might not yet have large pools of internal candidates to stoke an internal glass ceiling pattern, but their rapid growth generates many vacancies and promotion opportunities for candidates who are likely to be external. That these companies were resorting to large-scale recruiting over the Internet suggests a desire to expand their potential talent pool beyond their current workforce and direct network ties. For young, rapidly growing high-tech firms, focusing on external recruitment and hiring processes is likely to be the most effective way of tackling the glass ceiling. In this respect, our data analyses and “what if” simulations provide further guidance for designing policy efforts to address the glass ceiling. Our results suggest that, by themselves, bias-remediation policies designed to reduce gender discrimination in screening are likely to be of limited help in addressing the problem of the glass ceiling. By contrast, recruitment and outreach policies aimed at producing less-gendered candidate pools for jobs at various levels of the hierarchy are likely to pay the biggest dividends for organizations seeking to produce a more equitable distribution of men and women across their ranks. Appendix Table Table A.1. Full Logit Models Table A.1. Full Logit Models View larger version Table Table A.2. Replication of Models in Tables 4 and 5, within Racea Table A.2. Replication of Models in Tables 4 and 5, within Racea View larger version Additional results and copies of the computer programs used to generate the results presented in the article are available from the authors at or Notes 1Such concerns about the appropriateness of the risk set also apply to studies that examine gender patterns within and across organizations within a single market or system, as in the examples of Cohen and colleagues’ (1998) study of California savings and loan organizations. To the degree that hiring occurs from outside the system, then the risk set will be mis-specified, thus hindering inferences about gender differences in allocation to jobs across the system. 2See Fernandez and Mors (2008); Gorman and Kmec (2009); and Fernandez and Abraham (2010, 2011). In contrast with Kay and Hagan’s (1995) study of promotions in law firms, Gorman and Kmec (2009) specified both the internal and the external risk set when examining gender stratification within the relatively closed system of elite law firms. They found a pattern of increasing female disadvantage in internal promotion, but not in external hires. Fernandez and colleagues examined gender differences in both internal and external allocation within the context of three separate firms: a call-center (Fernandez and Mors 2008), a retail bank (Fernandez and Abraham 2010), and a BioPharma firm (Fernandez and Abraham 2011). All three of these latter studies lacked controls for human capital so caution is warranted. The descriptive evidence, however, suggests that external hiring processes alone can produce a glass ceiling pattern in which women become relatively scarcer at higher levels of the organizational hierarchy. 3Overall, the data set used includes 544,462 applications to 13,368 jobs at 1,270 companies received from December 2007 to March 2012. Of these 13,368 jobs, 581 were to student internship positions and were excluded from the analysis (yielding a sample of 517,981 applications to 12,787 full-time jobs). An additional 9,574 full-time jobs (253,307 applications) were excluded because of censoring (i.e., no hires occurred during the observation period). This led to a sample of 264,674 applications to 3,213 jobs. We also excluded 307 single-person jobs. For a portion of these queues (103), the candidate hired was internal, which suggests these were likely promotions for which a single internal candidate was considered. Excluding these jobs yields a sample of 2,906 jobs and 264,367 applications. Finally, we excluded 50 firms (190 jobs) in the data set that were not in the high-tech industry. Excluding these firms yielded a data set of 251,561 applications to 2,718 jobs at 441 firms. These 251,561 applications came from 234,011 individuals (1.07 applications per individual). 4Of our final sample of 251,561 applications, 44,177 (17.6%) did not include responses to questions about the applicants’ race or gender. In an additional 43,267 (17.2%) cases, the applicant selected “Decline to Identify” on the gender question, and in 52,638 (20.9%) cases, the applicant declined to identify his or her race. We were given access to the candidates’ first names and used the IBM InfoSphere Name Management Tool ( to score each name in terms of the likelihood of being female and were able to code gender for all but 3,488 (4.0%) of the 87,444 applicants who did not voluntarily provide their gender. Overall, we were able to identify gender for 248,073 cases, or 98.6% of these applications. 5Although our data include job openings across the full organizational hierarchy (i.e., from entry level to senior executive), firms may have also hired for other jobs without posting them on the system. In particular, firms may be less likely to post a job online when they have a strong internal contender to fill it. Given that we cannot rule out this possibility, our intent is not to discount the potential importance of internal promotion processes in contributing to the glass ceiling but rather to examine the extent to which external hiring processes can be an additional mechanism that leads to the relative scarcity of women at higher organizational levels. 6Note that unlike audit studies (Azmat and Petrongolo 2014), we do not have the benefit of random assignment when assessing screeners’ gender bias. We have, however, coded an unusually rich set of variables to control for some alternative explanations for our findings. One strength of our approach is that we study live hiring and examine both the interview and the job offer steps of the process. By contrast, audits are generally limited to examining the initial stages of contact with employers. Indeed, it may be ethically dubious and inherently infeasible to conduct a random assignment study of live hiring. Nevertheless, our analyses remain subject to the caveat that unobserved factors might explain our findings. 7Substantively similar results are obtained when hire is the outcome variable. 8In preliminary analyses, we found no evidence of a three-way interaction between female, internal, and level. 9In particular, years of work experience are positively and significantly related to interview chances, but this advantage is curvilinear and levels off since the associated squared term is also significant and negative. Years of management experience, however, works in the opposite way, with the linear term negatively related to interview chances, with a positive but insignificant squared term. Compared with candidates applying by way of the website, external referrals and those using “other” sources of application are also more likely to be interviewed. As expected, people living farther from work are less likely to be interviewed. Those applying later are slightly more likely to be interviewed than those applying earlier. Interestingly, the dummy variables for race indicate that racial minorities are less likely to be interviewed than are majority whites. While this is a focus of another article (Fernandez and Campero 2014), we checked whether race interacts with gender in the screening process by level in this context. Appendix Table A.2 documents that the gender differences by level we study here are also happening within race groups. The table shows no significant gender disparities in odds of interview for white, Asian, African American, or Hispanic applicants. Finally, in separate analysis, we find no evidence of a racial glass ceiling; although minorities are disadvantaged in screening, this disadvantage does not increase by level of the organization. 10The models in Table 4 pool candidates across job queues within each level of the organization. For this reason, it is possible that screeners’ biases might be masked by within-level heterogeneity in job queues. As a final check on whether gender-biased screening for interview is occurring at various levels of the organization, we further disaggregate all the analyses in Table 4 by estimating linear probability models with fixed effects for job queues, which purges all between-queue factors—both observed and unobserved—associated with job queues. We find the same pattern of findings as those in Table 4. 11Not all firms filled jobs at each level within each function and, as such, differences in gender composition by function and level can reflect differences between firms that posted jobs in each cell. For example, in the case of marketing, the share of females increases from the experienced level to the manager level. Firms that posted manager-level marketing jobs, however, are firms that attract more females overall. Although firm-level variation can generate unevenness in the pattern, the general trend in Table 6 shows fewer females in higher-level applicant pools within job function. 12To clarify the effects of gender at each level, we stratified the data by level and estimated the unconditional probability of job offer using all the controls used in Table 4, model 2. For the purposes of the simulations, we used level-specific point estimates, irrespective of whether the estimated odds were statistically significant. For the simulations corresponding to the whole population (Figure 3, scenario 2), the female/male odds of job offer by level are as follows: entry-level = 0.8916 (n.s.); mid-level = 0.8522 (p < .01); experienced = 0.8328 (p < .01); managers = 0.9512 (n.s.); executives = 1.0155 (n.s.). 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Friday, 28 September 2018

Effects of herbal nutraceuticals and/or zinc against Haemonchus contortus in lambs experimentally infected

BMC Vet Res. 2018 Mar 9;14(1):78. doi: 10.1186/s12917-018-1405-4. Váradyová Z1, Mravčáková D1, Babják M2, Bryszak M3, Grešáková Ľ1, Čobanová K1, Kišidayová S1, Plachá I1, Königová A2, Cieslak A3, Slusarczyk S4,5, Pecio L4, Kowalczyk M4, Várady M6. Author information 1 Institute of Animal Physiology, Centre of Biosciences, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Šoltésovej 4-6, 040 01, Košice, Slovak Republic. 2 Institute of Parasitology, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Hlinkova 3, 040 01, Košice, Slovak Republic. 3 Department of Animal Nutrition and Feed Management, Poznan University of Life Sciences, Wolynska 33, 60-637, Poznan, Poland. 4 Department of Biochemistry, Institute of Soil Science and Plant Cultivation, State Research Institute, Czartoryskich 8, 24-100, Pulawy, Poland. 5 Department of Pharmaceutical Biology with Botanical Garden of Medicinal Plants, Medical University of Wroclaw, Wroclaw, Poland. 6 Institute of Parasitology, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Hlinkova 3, 040 01, Košice, Slovak Republic. Abstract BACKGROUND: The gastrointestinal parasitic nematode Haemonchus contortus is a pathogenic organism resistant to several anthelmintics. This study assessed the efficacy of a medicinal herbal mixture (Herbmix) and organic zinc, as an essential trace element for the proper functioning of both unspecific and specific immune defensive mechanisms, against experimental infections with H. contortus in lambs. All lambs were infected orally with approximately 5000 third-stage larvae of a strain of H. contortus susceptible to anthelmintics (MHco1). Twenty-four female lambs 3-4 months of age were divided into four groups: unsupplemented animals (control), animals supplemented with Herbmix (Hmix), animals supplemented with organic zinc (Zn) and animals supplemented with Herbmix and organic zinc (Hmix+Zn). Eggs per gram (EPG) of faeces were quantified 20, 28, 35, 42, 49, 56, 62 and 70 d post-infection and mean abomasal worm counts were assessed 70 d post-infection. Samples of blood were collected from each animal 7, 35, 49 and 70 d post-infection. RESULTS: Quantitative analyses of the bioactive compounds in Herbmix identified three main groups: flavonoids (9964.7 μg/g), diterpenes (4886.1 μg/g) and phenolic acids (3549.2 μg/g). Egg counts in the lambs treated with Hmix, Zn and Hmix+Zn decreased after 49 d. The EPGs in the Zn and Hmix+Zn groups were significantly lower on day 56 (P < 0.05 and P < 0.01, respectively), and the EPGs and mean worm counts were significantly lower on day 70 in all supplemented groups (P < 0.05 and P < 0.01). Hemograms of complete red blood cells of each animal identified clinical signs of haemonchosis after day 35. Serum calprotectin concentrations and IgA levels were significantly affected by treatment. The treatment influenced serum malondialdehyde concentrations (P < 0.05) and sulfhydryl groups (P < 0.01) of antioxidant status. The mineral status was unaltered in all lambs. CONCLUSION: A direct anthelmintic impact on the viability of nematodes was not fully demonstrated, but the treatments with herbal nutraceuticals and zinc likely indirectly contributed to the increase in the resistance of the lambs to nematode infection. KEYWORDS: Anthelmintic activity; Egg counts; Gastrointestinal nematode; Haemonchus contortus; Herbal bioactive compounds; Mineral status; Organic zinc; Sheep

Thursday, 27 September 2018

2015 Ethos at stake: Performance management and academic work in universities

Show all authors Kirsi-Mari Kallio, Tomi J Kallio, Janne Tienari, ... First Published October 26, 2015 Research Article Article information Article has an altmetric score of 6 Free Access Abstract Higher education has been subject to substantial reforms as new forms of performance management are implemented in universities across the world. Extant research suggests that in many cases performance management systems have disrupted academic life. We complement this literature with an extensive mixed methods study of how the performance management system is understood by academics across universities and departments in Finland at a time when new management principles and practices are being forcefully introduced. While our survey results enabled us to map the generally critical and negative view that Finnish scholars have of performance management, the qualitative inquiry allowed us to disentangle how and why our respondents resent the ways and means of measuring their work, the assumptions that underlie the measurement, and the university ideal on which the performance management system is rooted. Most significantly, we highlight how the proliferation of performance management can be seen as a catalyst for changing the very ethos of what it is to be an academic and to do academic work. Keywords academic careers, academic work, ethos, knowledge-intensive organizations, management, organizational theory, performance appraisal and performance feedback, performance management, public management, university Introduction Higher education is subject to substantial reform as new forms of performance management (PM) are implemented in universities. It is argued that academia is becoming market oriented or marketized (Czarniawska and Genell, 2002) as it is viewed by policy-makers and other stakeholders as a service that is subject to competition between service providers (Engwall, 2007) and can be marketed to current and prospective customers (Ng and Forbes, 2009). At the same time, the work of individuals and groups in universities is increasingly determined by the strategic goals set for the organization (Patterson, 2001; Sousa et al., 2010). Close connections with business and industry are valued highly (Henkel, 2005), and external accountability is exercised through sophisticated measures and metrics (Marginson, 2008). This has been referred to as managerialism, emphasizing the role of management in efficiently allocating resources and ensuring through measurement and control systems that the goals of the organization are being pursued effectively (Chandler et al., 2002; Pollitt, 1993). In Europe, marketization and managerialism are promoted by the claim that universities are gaining more autonomy from the State to define their own strategies and to vitalize their funding base (Aarrevaara et al., 2009). However, the ‘internal rhythm’ of the university that once ensured for academics their precious ‘freedom of play’ as Derrida (1983: 19) put it, seems to be under threat. Higher education in Finland is a case in point. As a Nordic country, Finland prides itself on its high level of education available to all citizens regardless of wealth or family background. Equal access to higher education was one of the cornerstones of state-coordinated capitalism and the welfare state model practiced in Finland. The State provided the funding for universities and dictated their mandate to serve the educational needs of the nation (Kuoppala, 2005). Since the 1990s, however, ‘free market’ policies and practices have challenged the tenets of the welfare state and its approach to higher education (Aarrevaara et al., 2009). While a new performance-oriented approach to managing Finnish universities was first adopted in 1995, bringing about a gradual shift towards a market-oriented model (MinEdu, 2005), a radical change occurred in 2010 when a new University Act and funding scheme were introduced (Välimaa, 2012). These reforms aimed to enhance the competitiveness of the Finnish system of innovation in the global market, and they put unprecedented pressure on Finnish universities and academics to produce measurable results. Universities in Finland were put in a position where they had little leeway in choosing what objectives they wished to pursue. However, they had more autonomy over how to achieve these objectives in terms of their strategic focus, management approach and resource allocation (Kallio, 2014). Extant research across Europe suggests that market-driven managerialist reforms have disturbed the life of academics. Findings from the United Kingdom (Chandler et al., 2002; Parker and Jary, 1995; Willmott, 1995) are echoed in other countries where marketization and managerialism in higher education and academic work are a more recent phenomenon, including the Nordic countries (Czarniawska and Genell, 2002; Engwall, 2007; Krejsler, 2006; Raffnsøe-Møller, 2011; Ylijoki, 2005), the Netherlands (Sousa et al., 2010; ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012), Germany (Teichler, 2011) and France (Boitier and Reviere, 2013). The new externally exposed quantitative targets and metrics are argued to be in conflict with traditional academic values such as freedom, autonomy and belonging to a community, and this has been found to lead to insecurity among those who do academic work (Knights and Clarke, 2014; Ylijoki and Ursin, 2013). However, while PM and its effects in universities has been the subject of active discussion, the bulk of the research has either dealt with the higher education sector at large or has focused on select individuals and groups from particular university departments. We argue that there is a paucity of knowledge on how PM systems are understood by academics across universities and departments in a specific societal and socio-cultural setting at a time when new management principles and practices are actively introduced. In this article, we aim to elucidate how the ethos of being an academic is changing as a result of PM. Our contribution is based on an extensive study of scholars representing 12 departments in three universities in Finland where a significant change towards a new form of PM has been experienced. Our empirical materials include both quantitative survey data and responses to an open question (‘How does PM affect the attractiveness of an academic career?’). We applied a mixed methods approach in our study: while the survey results (including 966 academics) enabled us to map the generally critical and negative view that Finnish scholars have of PM, the qualitative inquiry (including 823 responses) allowed us to dig deeper into this criticism by disentangling its various topical issues and dimensions. Beyond metrics and measurement, our respondents describe the emergence of a new kind of university ideal that favors competition and short-term results over collegiality and academic discussion. Crucially, our findings indicate that for the majority of scholars, PM appears to be a catalyst that changes the very ethos of being an academic and doing academic work. We conclude that in the Finnish case this stance is something that is shared by academics across universities and fields of science, and argue that our comprehensive treatise of how scholars make sense of PM complements extant theorizing on the wider implications of such systems in universities and academic work. This article is structured as follows. We first address research on higher education reforms in general and the proliferation of PM principles and practices in particular. Next, we set the scene for our empirical study and outline higher education reforms in Finland. We then introduce our research design and offer examples from our data and analysis. Finally, we discuss our findings and offer conclusions on the basis of our study. Marketized and managerialist academia Since its inception, the concept of university has drawn meanings from surrounding society. Its position and relative autonomy has been legitimized and contested in different ways in different locations at different times. Universities have been subject to alternating religious, cultural, political and economic forces, and most universities in western countries have been a more or less independent part of the public sector. However, while societal and socio-cultural specificities have impacted the university institution, the structure and content of higher education – and the notion of the university – have also converged across nation-states at several historical junctions (Rüegg, 2004). Nevertheless, it is too simple to claim that universities today are experiencing a clear-cut change from a Humboldtian idea of the Ivory Tower, where free-thinking scholars pursue a call for the universal values of knowledge and truth, to a new system or regime. While advocates and critics of change construe social reality in universities in different ways, extant research suggests that the question of changing academic identities is more nuanced (Herbert and Tienari, 2013; Knights and Clarke, 2014; Sousa et al., 2010; Ylijoki, 2005; Ylijoki and Ursin, 2013). Variation in how higher education is assembled in different societies, too, continues to be ‘dazzling’ (Shavit et al., 2007). Different emphases notwithstanding, a general trend is in evidence where policy-makers take markets and business management as benchmarks for advocating transformation in higher education (Chandler et al., 2002). Although marketization has proceeded at a different pace (Krejsler, 2006) and taken somewhat different forms (Czarniawska and Genell, 2002) in different countries, current pressures for transforming the position and function of universities are strikingly similar across the West and beyond (Wedlin, 2008). In effect, marketization means that universities are expected to compete against each other in attracting the ‘best’ students and scholars as well as funding from the market in order to deliver a high quality service (Engwall, 2007; Hemsley-Brown and Goonawardana, 2007). The UK was a forerunner in this development in Europe in that policy reforms that embraced market discourse (Fairclough, 1993) leading to the ‘commodification’ (Willmott, 1995) or ‘McDonaldization’ of higher education (Parker and Jary, 1995) and stress among academics (Chandler et al., 2002) took place somewhat earlier than in most other European countries. Resistance, compliance and ambivalence could be witnessed among academics facing the new order (Chandler et al., 2002; Clegg and McAuley, 2005; Gleeson and Shain, 1999; Henkel, 2005). Perceived harshness in how market-driven managerialism was implemented in universities was characteristic of the UK experience (Chandler et al., 2002). State policies in Europe today are not only based on cutting down public spending but also on viewing universities as producers of knowledge that need to become more ‘open’ to wider society and to the global economy (Aarrevaara et al., 2009). Universities are expected to make themselves useful to external stakeholders such as business and industry. Among other things, this means that universities are recommended to embrace multi- and interdisciplinarity (Gibbons et al., 1994) rather than to protect their conventional disciplinary boundaries as a source of identity and autonomy (Henkel, 2005). This discourse has been embraced in countries such as Finland (Aspara et al., 2014) and Sweden (Styhre and Lind, 2010). In this way, the new dominant discourse establishes economic development as a key function for the university alongside research and teaching to the extent that the ideal university is dubbed ‘entrepreneurial’ (Clark, 1998), and senior scholars embracing it can be called ‘entrepreneurial professors’ (Lam, 2008). Universities are also conceptualized as hubs that operate at the intersection of institutional domains in the knowledge economy (Powell and Snellman, 2004; Stevens et al., 2008), acting as producers, repositories and brokers of knowledge in building bridges between basic research and its various applications (Starkey and Madan, 2001). At the same time, in the discourse of marketization, higher education is presented as a service, and universities are seen as service providers that are measured in terms of the ‘use value’ they provide for their customers (Ng and Forbes, 2009). Overall, in becoming marketized, universities have engaged in a balancing act where they are expected to comply to global standards of quality and its evaluation on the one hand, and to differentiate themselves from their competitors on key quality criteria on the other. They must lend themselves to standardization and ‘make themselves comparable,’ as Czarniawska and Genell (2002: 455) put it, but also ensure that they stand out in the ensuing competition with other service providers. To achieve this, universities worldwide have begun to systematically clarify their strategic goals (Patterson, 2001) and to employ marketing, brand and reputation management strategies to craft favorable perceptions among their key stakeholders (Aspara et al., 2014; Chapleo, 2010; Lowrie, 2007; Waeraas and Solbakk, 2009). They have also introduced new forms of academic career systems to attract ‘top talent’ across the world (Herbert and Tienari, 2013). Extant research further suggests that with marketization comes managerialism, which reasserts ‘management’s right to manage’ (Gleeson and Shain, 1999: 465). The discourse of marketization establishes that universities need to be professionally managed so that they are better equipped to fulfill their service function in society. Indeed, it claims that they can be readily compared to other service providers (Engwall, 2007). Marketization is thus characterized by the increasingly influential position of career managers in universities who tend to hold an instrumental view of ‘use value’ rather than assuming that universities have an intrinsic value defined by the academic community itself (Aspara et al., 2014). In other words, they have a tendency to run universities like businesses (Chandler et al., 2002; Parker, 2014). Moreover, Whitchurch (2008) has used the term ‘third space professionals’ to denote the highly qualified specialist staff members who have become increasingly influential in universities. In addition to career managers and administrators, scholars are converted into managers to do the work of filtering market-driven principles into the academic workplace (Clegg and McAuley, 2005; Gleeson and Shain, 1999; Sousa et al., 2010). Overall, marketization is reflected in how the performance of scholars is managed. New measurement systems, instruments and metrics that target performance in terms of ‘use value’ put new demands on academic work and on those who do it (Marginson, 2008; ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012; Ylijoki, 2005). Such measurement serves the purpose of detailing how the university compares with its competition, how it succeeds in accreditations and how it fares in university rankings (Wedlin, 2008) or ‘league tables.’ Performance management and its discontents With the new systems and metrics, a particular philosophy – or ideology – of managerialism enters the university, with PM as its integral part (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). Sousa et al. (2010) argue that PM differs from traditional academic quality assessment via peer reviews in two significant ways. First, outputs are compared with objectives and used for comparative benchmarking. Second, outputs are linked to input and used for assessing efficiency in the use of resources. A peer review, then, is considered something that can be harnessed as a tool in managerialist performance appraisal. Ter Bogt and Scapens (2012) further detail a shift from a developmental to a judgmental measurement of performance; whereas traditionally measurement in universities served to develop individuals to improve their future performance, the new system seeks to quantitatively evaluate their past performance. This underscores that external standardization of the criteria for excellence in terms of departments and individuals plays an increasingly central role in contemporary academia (Czarniawska and Genell, 2002). Managerialism elevates metrics and indicators, and the system is likely to become self-referential and self-fulfilling. Hines (1988) argued that accounting does not merely communicate some pre-existing objective reality but serves to produce that reality. As Fauré et al. (2010: 1249) put it: ‘accounting, in all of its manifestations, produces the organization, and does not simply occur within it.’ Constructing a PM system, choosing the metrics and indicators, and implementing it are efficient means for constructing reality within the academia. In due course, you get what you measure. This fundamental self-fulfilling feature of management control systems in academia has not passed unnoticed (Ylijoki and Ursin, 2013). There is ample evidence to suggest that PM has led to discontent among scholars in universities (Anderson, 2008; Chandler et al., 2002; Henkel, 2005; Knights and Clarke, 2014; Parker and Jary, 1995; Sousa et al., 2010; Willmott, 1995; Ylijoki, 2005; Ylijoki and Ursin, 2013). Willmott (1995) lamented the commodifying logic of capitalism that permeates academia, and Parker and Jary (1995) argued that it increases the power of management and diminishes the autonomy of academics. External accountability and serving the transient needs of business and industry have arguably led to more short-term thinking in academic work where the fast pace of corporate research and development (R&D) is mimicked (Styhre and Lind, 2010). It also feeds individualism that, the critics remind us, may be detrimental to collaboration and a sense of community in academia (Ylijoki, 2005). At the same time, enthusiastic calls for interdisciplinarity (Gibbons et al., 1994) have further complicated academic work in that established disciplinary conventions and theoretical debates are openly challenged (Henkel, 2005). Paradoxically, however, in fields such as business studies, the new metrics of research performance have been found to support the crafting of methodologically elegant discipline-based publications with little or no practical relevance (Michailova, 2011). It would appear that scholars no longer see themselves as governors of their Republics of Scholars. Some critics have even argued that universities have been ‘hijacked’ by career managers and administrators whose sovereignty is placed above the interests of scholars and students (Aronowitz, 2000; Ginsberg, 2011) and who feel entitled to discount the past and claim that ‘everyone who is against change is either self-interested or doesn’t understand the “real world”’ (Parker, 2014: 281). As such, it has been argued that marketization and managerialism run into problems because universities are not like other organizations and because academic work is not like any other work. Universities do not have clearly delineated producer and consumer roles for either themselves or their stakeholders, and this renders the emerging instrumental focus on ‘use value’ problematic (Aspara et al., 2014). Instead, the various kinds of value that universities provide in the form of research, education and societal impact are co-created with myriad stakeholders with different and sometimes conflicting interests and expectations – think of, for example, local and international scholarly communities, current and prospective students, alumni, employers, donors, accreditors and the State – rather than produced unilaterally by the university and consumed by particular customer groups (Naude and Ivy, 1999). Developing and retaining an academic identity1 seems to be as ambivalent and confusing as ever. In the Humboldtian discourse cherished until recently in countries like Finland (Välimaa, 2012), idealized expectations of what it means to be a scholar include originality and a passion for independent critical thinking (Gabriel, 2010; Krejsler, 2006). For those inclined to draw on this discourse the intensification of academic work and the demands for external accountability can be overwhelming; the Humboldtian ideal is even more difficult to live up to than before (Ylijoki and Ursin, 2013), and the new market-driven and managerialist university is likely to feed insecurity among scholars (Knights and Clarke, 2014),2 especially as it is increasingly based on control from a distance and through a faceless system (ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012). To work with this insecurity in identity, historical notions of academia and academic work can be tapped into, and the present and future can be contrasted with the past. Market discourse can be criticized and ridiculed in nostalgic comparisons with the good old days (Ylijoki, 2005). Alternatively, this discourse can be a source of great enthusiasm when new ideas and metrics are embraced as a remedy to the inefficiencies and inequalities of the past (Dowd and Kaplan, 2005; Tienari, 2012). In other words, academic identities can be narrated in multiple ways (Ylijoki and Ursin, 2013). While extant research has shed light on the various aspects of how PM affects academic work and identities, we still lack a comprehensive understanding of how scholars across universities, departments and fields of science make sense of this shift. In the following sections, we set the scene for developing such an understanding with regard to Finnish universities by outlining reforms in the Finnish higher education sector over the past 20 years. While PM principles and practices faced today are grounded in reforms introduced since the 1990s, the change towards managerialism in Finland has accelerated rapidly since 2010. Higher education reforms and performance management in Finnish universities In 1995, at a time when many western governments introduced reforms in higher education, the Ministry of Education in Finland3 adopted a new approach to managing universities. While the Finnish term used for this approach is ‘management by results’ – grounded in Peter Drucker’s (1954) notion of management by objectives – its spirit and content are in line with what has been referred to in the literature as PM (Sousa et al., 2010; ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012).4 While the PM model was introduced to the Finnish public sector by the Ministry of Finance in the late 1980s, it became an important doctrine in dealing with the severe economic recession of the early 1990s. Since 1997, the PM model has been used regularly in budgetary negotiations between the Ministry and universities to determine the amount of funding for each university (Kuoppala, 2005; Salminen, 2003). Detailed objectives are set out and funding is allocated in exchange for measureable output. Today, there are a total of 14 universities in Finland that are by law administered by the Ministry of Education and Culture. Most of the funding for Finnish universities is still provided by the State. From 1995 to 2013, however, the Finnish higher education sector was subject to several structural and operational reforms. The university funding scheme was renewed several times, the basis of funding and the applied indicators were changed, the university employees’ pay scheme was renewed, and the University Act was enacted and revised. The major changes in higher education and governmental policy affecting the steering of Finnish universities are summarized in Figure 1. The emphasis on output has become increasingly imminent in the PM model, which now emphasizes the autonomy of university management in finding the means for securing the desired output. The control mechanism in the system is based on outcomes and ex post monitoring as opposed to the previous, ex ante planning model. figure Figure 1. Changes in the Finnish higher education and governmental level policies during the last 20 years. PM = performance management. The most important changes in the Finnish higher education sector took effect in 2010 with the renewal of the University Act and the university funding scheme (Välimaa, 2012). Several universities were merged, and more detailed objectives for the funding for each university were set. While the performance indicators for State funding were fine-tuned again in 2013, it is generally agreed that the changes in 2010 affected the PM of Finnish universities in a fundamental way. With the new University Act, the number of study credits and degrees, the amount of external funding and the number of publications became the main indicators in the university funding scheme. This put Finnish universities in a new position where detailed outcome targets at university level and managing the performance of each scholar gave universities little leeway in choosing what objectives they wished to pursue, although they had relatively more autonomy over how to do this. Moreover, as the State budget for the universities remained at the same level, the universities were now in practice forced to compete with each other for their public as well as private funding. It seems that the steering hold of the Ministry increased rather than decreased with the reforms that took effect in 2010 (Kallio, 2014). Like other member-states of the European Union, renewing the university funding scheme in Finland is heavily influenced by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommendations. Although the OECD has no formal authority over States and universities, it is highly influential in the promotion of ideas of what good government is and what constitutes good university management (Aarrevaara et al., 2009). The role of universities has become increasingly instrumental as they are seen as the promoters and executors of ‘national innovation policies’ (Kristensen et al., 2011). Under the rubric of the ‘third mission,’ the University Act of 2010 encourages Finnish universities to interact with, and contribute to, industry and society through research and education. In the Education and Research 2011–2016 development plan of the Ministry of Education and Culture, it is stated that ‘university . . . research, development and innovation will be used to diversify the industrial structure, to develop the creative economy and new growth areas . . . to renew the service structures in society, and to promote sustainable growth’ (MinEdu, 2012: 46). Overall, while the primary purpose of the Ministry in introducing and revising the PM system has been to redirect the higher education sector as a whole (Kuoppala, 2005; Kallio and Kallio, 2014; Salminen, 2003), institutional changes have been found to affect the internal functioning of universities; for example, in terms of management (Aspara et al., 2014) and career systems (Herbert and Tienari, 2013). This is argued to have contributed to a polarization of identity constructions among academics between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ even among colleagues in the same department (Ylijoki and Ursin, 2013). Research design and process The empirical materials for our study were generated by administrating a survey in August–September 2010 in three universities located in different geographical regions in Finland. The survey was timed after the renewal of the University Act in 2010 and the universities’ funding scheme. Our sample comprised scholars in four departments5 in each university: business and economics, mathematics and natural sciences, humanities, and education sciences. The materials were generated by an internet-based survey questionnaire that was sent to all academic employees in the chosen departments. This totaled 2870 people in research- and/or teaching-oriented positions (referred to as ‘academics’ and ‘scholars’ in this article). A total of 966 respondents completed and returned the survey. The response rate of 33.6 percent can be considered very satisfactory (Baruch and Holtom, 2008). A non-response analysis by university, department and field of science indicated no systematic loss, and the share of men and women as well as the amount of full professors and other teaching and research staff in our data were in line with the demographics of Finnish universities. The survey included an open question: ‘How does Management by Results [i.e. PM] affect the attractiveness of an academic career?’ A total of 823 scholars (85% of all respondents) answered this open question. It is noteworthy that many of the respondents wrote a lengthy passage of text, reflecting in detail not only on academic career, but on the impact of PM principles and practices on academic work, the university ideal, and being an academic. We applied a mixed method approach where different types of data complement each other in developing insights on the phenomenon studied (Morse, 2003). We followed Miles and Huberman’s (2002: 396) advice in that ‘quantitative and qualitative inquiry can support and inform each other in important ways.’ Our quantitative analysis of responses to the survey questionnaire enabled us to map the overall perceptions of the respondents toward the PM system in use. This mapping informed the focus of our qualitative analysis of the responses to the open question, which enabled us to explore the reasoning behind the responses. Overall, our research process was iterative in that we moved back and forth between developing our theoretical framing and elaborating on our empirical analysis. In terms of the former, we first considered using a framing inspired by institutional theory (i.e. contrasting institutional logics), but eventually settled for a focus on the problematics of PM in universities and academic work. In terms of empirical analysis, the theoretical choices led us to elaborate specifically on our qualitative inquiry. First, we analyzed the responses of the quantitative part of the survey, which depicted perceptions about PM. Among other things, the results show that PM is considered by our respondents to have been unsuccessful in Finnish universities. This is illustrated in Table 1, which depicts respondents’ satisfaction with the current PM system broken down by field of science. A large share of respondents from all 12 university departments indicated that they were not satisfied with the current PM system. Although academics are encouraged to think critically, we interpret the amount of respondents not satisfied with PM to echo a generally negative impression of the higher education reforms and the new university funding scheme. At the same time, as indicated in Table 2, the majority of our respondents in all departments indicated that PM has no clear steering effect in their own work and does not affect their work efficiency. Furthermore, only 19 percent of the respondents definitely or mostly agreed with the statement that PM is useful in encouraging researchers to produce innovations. With regard to these responses, no statistically significant differences were detected on the basis of background variables, such as the respondent’s university, department, position and years of employment. These findings led us to dig deeper into the reasoning behind the responses. Table Table 1. Satisfaction with the current performance management system by field of science. Table 1. Satisfaction with the current performance management system by field of science. View larger version Table Table 2. Claims concerning performance management (PM). Table 2. Claims concerning performance management (PM). View larger version Second, we analyzed the responses to the open question in the survey (‘How does Management by Results [i.e. PM] affect the attractiveness of an academic career?’). Using open questions arguably resembles a semi-structured interview setting in that respondents are not asked to choose from predefined options but can use their own words and expressions in dealing with the question (Kovalainen and Eriksson, 2008). Reading the 823 responses several times, it became clear to us that they could be positioned into categories of negative effect, no effect, positive effect, dual effect (positive and negative), or indifferent. This led to a general breakdown of the overall content that was in line with the survey results, where the majority (55% of all responses) depicted a negative view of PM on the attractiveness of academic career (see Figure 2). figure Figure 2. Percentage breakdown of the effects of performance management on the attractiveness of an academic career. Third, we carried out an in-depth thematic analysis of the responses to the open question. This led us to identify different aspects and dimensions of PM on the basis of which the respondents unpacked its effects on the attractiveness of an academic career. The texts were filled with irony and sarcasm as well as witty observations of the state of Finnish universities. The reasoning of the respondents seemed to revolve around four dimensions: (1) what is measured, by whom, and how; (2) what are the assumptions that underlie performance measurement; (3) what kind of a university ideal is created through PM; and (4) what kind of academic ethos should academics harbor in the system. Distinctions between ‘old’ and ‘new’ academia were (re)constructed in relation to these dimensions. Examples of responses by our respondents, categorized by the four dimensions identified, are offered in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6. Table Table 3. Reflections on measurement and metrics. Table 3. Reflections on measurement and metrics. View larger version Table Table 4. Reflections on assumptions underlying performance measurement. Table 4. Reflections on assumptions underlying performance measurement. View larger version Table Table 5. Reflections on the ‘new’ academia. Table 5. Reflections on the ‘new’ academia. View larger version Table Table 6. Reflections on the ‘new’ academics. Table 6. Reflections on the ‘new’ academics. View larger version Distinguishing between different dimensions of PM and its impact is an analytical exercise informed by our theoretical framing. Many individual responses incorporate several dimensions, and the dimensions often overlap in the responses (e.g. more than one dimension is discussed in the same sentence). We do not imply that we are projecting some kind of objective reality with our analysis; rather, we realize that our reading of the materials is not exhaustive and exclusive. Other readings based on other theoretical framings are possible. However, we have attempted to be systematic and transparent in our research process as well as in reporting our findings so that the reader is able to follow our line of argumentation and decide whether our conclusions are plausible. In the following, we specify and illustrate the ways in which PM is understood by our respondents to impact academic work and being an academic. Academics facing performance management First, the question of what is measured, by whom, and how, formed an integral part of how our respondents perceived the effects of PM on the attractiveness of academic career (see Table 3). PM was viewed through the measures and metrics used as well as the practices of performance appraisal applied in the measurement. A typical way to address this was to assert that PM increases ‘bureaucracy’ in the university, and that it is not only time-consuming and irrelevant but also alien to academic work. At the same time, a clear distinction between academic employees and ‘administration’ was constructed in the responses. ‘In a sensible world you’d seek to keep administration as light and local as possible,’ a female lecturer in humanities remarked. ‘However, sensibility has never been a criterion in any educational reforms in Finland, so I guess it’s just too much to ask.’ A recurring theme in the responses was that ‘bureaucracy’ (administration) multiplies itself even in conditions of austerity in universities. Another theme highlighted in the responses was the inequality that the metrics and measurement construes between different disciplines and research traditions. A typical general concern raised by our respondents was that the system favors natural sciences at the expense of social sciences and humanities because of the differences in publishing traditions and processes. To simplify, in social sciences and humanities, the tradition is to publish alone or with select partners with qualitative data generated over extensive periods of time, whereas in natural sciences the tradition is to publish at fast speed with quantitative data and with a large number of scholars as authors. The current PM system is commonly understood to favor the latter. As stated by a male professor in business and economics:In some fields, notable international research is a natural part of making a career, and the PM system could even encourage this; whereas in other fields, the situation is completely different. The system may in fact effectively shrivel some fields of science completely. If this happens, the educational role of the university in society is in real danger. Overall, PM was considered by our respondents to discourage innovation and novelty and lead to bland research. They pitted quality against quantity and were confident that the new system favored the latter. Furthermore, our respondents flagged the shift from collegial university management to quantitative measurement on all levels, from the university to department and to individuals. Measuring the performance of individuals was perceived to lead to ‘industrial manufacturing of research,’ as a female researcher in mathematics and natural sciences put it: ‘[With] artificial quantitative measurements, quantity does not guarantee quality. It does not encourage risk-taking and groundbreaking research [i.e. research] that involves the chance of failure. It encourages easy and mundane publications, so that the numbers look good.’ Second, the question of what assumptions underlie performance measurement spurred strong comments about being under surveillance (Parker and Jary, 1995; see also Lorenz, 2012; Sewell et al., 2012). Beyond the practical nuisance caused by PM practices, the system was perceived to cause anxiety and stress (see Table 4). Assumptions about what academics are like and what they (should) do in order to perform well in their career gave rise to considerations of a shift from developmental evaluation, where the core of the system is personal progress, to judgmental PM, where the system serves to control and steer academic work from the outside (ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012). A male lecturer in educational sciences put it: ‘At any rate, [PM] does not increase the attractiveness [of an academic career]. Creative work requires a certain amount of freedom and flexibility, which are now under threat.’ Typical responses dealing with the underlying assumptions of PM also claimed that the system encourages short-term thinking, which can lead to sub-optimization in the functioning of the university. As a male lecturer in mathematics and natural sciences put it: ‘Your career as a researcher is lifelong, not the duration of a given funding period.’ However, while the dominant perception of PM in our data was distinctively negative, some respondents wrote about the metrics-based evaluation system as a positive development. A typical response was that owing to PM, it is possible to quickly advance in your academic career and that there are more opportunities to increase your salary with excellent performance. As a female researcher in humanities wrote: ‘It is attractive that people’s merits can be compared with clear criteria (the amount of publications and their quality). It is possible to get ahead in your career as a young person.’ Third, our respondents reflected on the question of what kind of a university ideal is created through PM (see Table 5). The representations and meanings attached to the university ideal were perceived to be changing. Our respondents implied that the ideal of academia is changing from Humboldtian to market oriented. It was argued that the practical or business interests pushed forward by marketization and managerialism prevail in how key stakeholders see universities. Academically interesting research is run over by applied research interests. As stated by a female researcher in humanities: [PM] doesn’t attract those kinds of people who believe that in the cradle of academia people think and discuss deep philosophical questions for hours – the current university doesn’t enable this with its increasing demands, and idealists can perceive this as really frustrating. Fourth, and finally, the question of what academic ethos scholars should harbor in the university where performance is measured in new ways prompted our respondents to reflect on the attractiveness of an academic career from the perspective of the profound changes taking place in academic identity (see Table 6). This was done by providing examples of a profound change in the ethos of academic work. Our respondents were concerned about identities that become available in pursuing an academic career – and what identities are simultaneously marginalized and excluded. Those responses that dealt with the changing ethos of academic work constructed a narrative on how being a scholar has changed for the worse. Many respondents explicitly noted that a new kind of scholar is attracted to the changing academic ethos and the adoption of more judgmental PM practices that enables fast career development for some; these scholars are typically unlike those with whom the respondent themselves (presumably) identify. A male professor in business and economics stated: ‘[PM] makes an academic career seem less interesting to gifted and smart people, but it might persuade other kinds of people, so that there is a constant supply of labor.’ In a similar vein, a male lecturer in business and economics suggested: [The effects of PM on the attractiveness of an academic career] is deteriorating unless you have status ambitions to become a publishing machine because that’s the only way you can be appointed to better positions. And it is possible to develop the ability to manufacture articles without actually saying anything meaningful and relevant. Even if it were generally perceived that the new PM system had a negative effect on the attractiveness of an academic career, some respondents explicitly underlined their strong intrinsic motivation to be a scholar and their ethos towards doing meaningful academic research (Karran, 2009; Kallio and Kallio, 2014). For example, a female professor in humanities stated: ‘An academic career is attractive as it is, and [PM] cannot destroy that attractiveness entirely.’ Numerous respondents indicated that the ethos of the new academics is competitive as the current PM indicators favor opportunistic, career-oriented people who are likely to neglect tasks not appreciated by the indicators, such as teaching (Herbert and Tienari, 2013; Kallio and Kallio, 2014). Such people were contrasted with others (presumably like the respondents themselves) who still harbor the traditional collegial academic ethos. However, the latter were predicted to ‘fade away from Finnish academia,’ as a female lecturer in educational sciences put it. ‘Opportunists survive’ as they are ‘more fitted for this job,’ as a male lecturer in business and economics concluded. Discussion How are we to theorize on the findings detailed above? Our study of academics in three Finnish universities indicates that the principles and practices of PM are generally understood to give rise to a ‘new’ academia that emphasizes not the objectives of academic work per se but rather the measures and metrics representing those objectives. Previously, the peer review practice meant that the work came before the person, but in the new academia, products are used to qualify persons (Sousa et al., 2010). Managing academic performance in new and more judgmental ways is not merely about metrics and measurement (ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012); it construes a new university ideal. The new academia is based on the assumption that academics need to be controlled from the outside, and our respondents comment on this ‘surveillance’ with some irony and sarcasm (Parker and Jary, 1995; see also Lorenz, 2012; Sewell et al., 2012). They are acutely aware that with the proliferation of PM principles and practices, the very meaning of the university is (once more) challenged. Our findings underscore that the work done in universities has become a site of struggle between scholars and other interest groups ‘for control of matters previously taken for granted as academic prerogative’ (Henkel, 2005: 164). PM does not remove subjectivity in measurement but relocates it at a greater distance from the measured subject (ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012). Our respondents lament the increase of ‘bureaucracy’ that accompanies the adoption of PM. While not entirely surprising, this may be considered paradoxical when the crux of the new system is considered: while efficient use of inputs to produce maximum output is the rationale for why performance in universities is measured in new ways (Sousa et al., 2010), our respondents argue that it leads to meaningless extra work and sub-optimization of resources from the point of view of the university as a whole. Perhaps most fundamentally, however, it serves to change the ethos of what it means to be an academic; it disrupts the sense of collective identity among scholars and accentuates an elusive search for meaningfulness (Knights and Clarke, 2014; Ylijoki and Ursin, 2013). Figure 3 summarizes the four dimensions of the change brought about by PM as seen by our respondents. figure Figure 3. Dimensions of performance management in the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ academia. The question of changing ethos is significant because it cuts to the originality, autonomy and freedom at the heart of academic work. A focal point in marketization and managerialism in universities is the renegotiation and dissolution of academic freedom (Tierney and Lechuga, 2010), which has traditionally involved a freedom different from other occupations (Baruch and Hall, 2004). For individuals and groups in universities, academic freedom has meant ‘free’ choice of research topics and methods and ‘being trusted to manage the pattern of one’s working life and priorities’ (Henkel, 2005: 169). It has perhaps also meant a mandate to voice criticism that is independent of external interests. Neave (1988) talked about academic autonomy (rather than freedom) as the right to determine the nature of one’s work within a community of scholars. With reference to universities as organizations, Czarniawska and Genell (2002: 472) view the change in academic freedom and autonomy in terms of a dilemma: while the (traditional) epistemic culture fostered by universities is based on plurality of thought and a pledge to ‘fight totalizing language,’ universities are dependent on their perceived legitimacy, which in the current system means that they are forced to adhere to some form of standardization of goals and criteria of success in order to be taken seriously by key stakeholders such as the State and the business community. Our respondents see the adoption of PM as a violation of academic freedom and of the traditional collegial values of university. Marginson (2008), however, points to complexity in the ways in which marketization and managerialism afford some freedoms while restraining others. Retaining a critical perspective to the new discourse, he argues for a fine-grained understanding of gains and losses of individual freedoms. In the same spirit, and answering to Karran’s (2009) call for empirical inquiry on how scholars comprehend change in their freedoms, Herbert and Tienari (2013) show how scholars faced with new management systems may perceive that they have less power to determine the goals of their work (because university managers and administrators now intend to do that) while still retaining some freedom to control how those goals are achieved. Our respondents demonstrate a more one-dimensional conception of academic freedom and autonomy, and the notion of changing ethos captures its essence. While under perceived threat people tend to become increasingly aware of where their allegiances lie, pressures for change in universities show how identity and insecurity are ‘conditions and consequences of one another; insecurity tends to generate a preoccupation with stabilizing our identity yet the contingent nature of the world makes such stability unrealizable and this reinforces the very insecurity that we expect identity to dissipate’ (Knights and Clarke, 2014: 336). In our data, this takes the form of academic nostalgia that Ylijoki (2005) referred to as the collective yearning for the good old days. She presented nostalgia not as an objective description but as a selective idealization and simplification of the past, which serves as a coping mechanism that enables scholars to deal with the changing conditions and conflicting pressures in their work. Another aspect of this coping is that the majority of our respondents indicate that they do not let PM have a steering effect on their own work. However, such ‘resistance’ has a distinctive melancholy flavor in our data. Typically, the reflections are about anticipating the future as much as they are about describing the present. The sensemaking is forward-looking but in a pessimistic way. At the same time, some scholars in our sample clearly embrace PM and the competition it encourages. These scholars resemble what Dowd and Kaplan (2005) refer to as ‘mavericks’ who see themselves as entrepreneurs rather than as members of academic communities and who are self-contained and engaged in their own personal development. Perhaps these individuals offer a glimpse of things to come in Finnish universities: the new academia may give rise to new elites who accelerate in their careers and occupy professorships at a young age while indoctrinating their own doctoral students to the competitive ethos. PM may thus reinforce the polarization of academic identity constructions into losing out and becoming successful (Ylijoki and Ursin, 2013). Hence, metrics (over)emphasizing particular indicators over others may become a self-fulfilling prophecy (see Fauré et al., 2010; Hines, 1988) in terms of who is considered eligible to do academic work. Conclusion Our extensive study of Finnish academics has offered a comprehensive analysis of how PM is changing universities, academic work and academics. As such, it complements extant theorizing on the wider implications of PM systems in academia. We conclude that the ethos of what it means to be an academic is at stake, as a new competitive ethos is challenging the traditional collegial academic ethos. It directs those who do academic work to pursue goals that are rewarded by PM measures and metrics, even if the scholars themselves do not agree with the rationale and usefulness of these indicators. While contemporary reforms in higher education and university management converge across the West and beyond (Wedlin, 2008), we suggest that more attention should be paid to the societal and socio-cultural context where principles and practices of PM are adopted and adapted. How Humboldtian discourse on autonomous and free-thinking scholars fares in the face of PM is a case in point. A significant feature of the Finnish case is that after over a decade of more incremental change fundamental reforms are now carried out quickly and methodically, putting unprecedented pressure on scholars to reconsider their relationship to the work they do and, indeed, their academic identities. While universities in Finland have traditionally been seen in the Humboldtian spirit as national cultural institutions (Välimaa, 2012), the new system affords them a more instrumental role and steers them towards competition with each other. It is not a surprise, then, that the question of ethos emerged as prominent in our study. Some 20 years earlier, in their study of UK academia, Parker and Jary (1995) concluded that marketization and managerialism should be resisted in universities, but not with nostalgia for a previous order. How nostalgia plays into the responses by academics facing radical change needs to be studied further, especially if we want to better understand the idiosyncratic forms and possibilities of resistance in the new academia in the West and beyond. While we have made some progress in studying academics who face PM, our empirical material is limited to Finland. Comparative studies – carried out in universities in different countries – of the adoption and translation of PM and its consequences for academic work are needed in order to understand how variations in the organization of higher education impact upon the experience of change in academia. Funding This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. Notes 1In keeping with, for example, Ylijoki and Ursin (2013) and Knights and Clarke (2014), identity is understood here as (re)constructed, negotiated and worked in social interaction, and it seeks to answer questions such as ‘who am I?’ and ‘how should I act?’ 2The proliferation of university branding has arguably accelerated the insecurity of academic identities. While some critics argue that universities have turned into promotional institutions (Hearn 2010), others suggest that higher education is inherently too complex for corporate brand management techniques to be applicable (Lowrie, 2007; Waeraas and Solbakk, 2009; Chapleo 2010). Nevertheless, managers and administrators in universities embrace branding in their quest for competitive positioning and advantage. 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[Email:] Tomi J Kallio is Professor of Management and Organization at Turku School of Economics at the University of Turku, Finland. He holds PhDs both in Administrative Science (University of Tampere) and in Business Economics (Turku School of Economics). His research and teaching interests include organizational theory, performance management, knowledge-intensive organizations, organizational creativity, responsible business and research methodology. He has published in journals such as Studies in Higher Education, Policy Studies, Facilities, Journal of Business Ethics and Culture and Organization. [Email:] Janne Tienari is Professor of Organization and Management at Aalto University School of Business, Finland. Tienari’s research and teaching interests include managing multinational corporations, mergers and acquisitions, strategy work, gender and diversity, branding and media, and changing academia. His latest passion is to understand management, new generations and the future. His work has been published in leading organization and management studies journals such as Human Relations, Organization, Organization Studies, Journal of Management Studies, Academy of Management Review and Organization Science. [Email:] Timo Hyvönen is Professor of Accounting in the School of Management at University of Tampere, Finland. His work has been published in a variety of journals like European Accounting Review, Management Accounting Research, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal and Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management. His research interests include management accounting change, performance measurement, accounting profession, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems and public sector accounting. [Email:] View Abstract