- 1Center
of Natural and Human Sciences, Federal University of ABC, Av. dos
Estados 5001, 09210-580, Bairro Bangú, Santo André, SP, Brazil;
Institute of Advanced Studies, University of São Paulo, Rua da Reitoria
109, 05508-050, Cidade Universitária, São Paulo, SP, Brazil. Electronic
address: lorenzo_baravalle@yahoo.it.
- 2Centre for Philosophy of Sciences, University of Lisbon, 1749-016, Campo Grande, Lisbon, Portugal. Electronic address: davide.s.vecchi@gmail.com.
Abstract
In
this paper we aim to amend the traditional analogy at the heart of
evolutionary epistemologies. We shall first argue, contrary to what has
been frequently done, that both hypothesis generation and the processes
of generation of genetic and phenotypic change are often directed as
well as environmentally conditioned. Secondly, we shall argue that
environmental influence does not affect trial generation directly but
that environmental information is processed by the epistemic agent and
by the biological organism respectively. Thirdly, we suggest conceiving
hypothesis generation as a process of manipulative abduction and the
generation of biological variation as a process mediated by phenotypic
plasticity. Finally, we argue that manipulative abduction and
environmentally-induced biological variation modulated by plasticity are
analogous because they both involve a conjectural response to
environmental cues. Our analysis thus vindicates a revised version of
evolutionary epistemology ascribing a fundamental role to both organism
and environment in trial generation. This perspective, in our opinion,
offers support to the thesis, inspired by the theory of embodied
cognition, that hypothesis generation is sometimes explained by an
appeal to phenotypic plasticity.
Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
KEYWORDS:
Environmental induction; Evolutionary epistemology; Manipulative abduction; Phenotypic plasticity
