Bioethics. 2008 Feb;22(2):92-100. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00604.x.
- 1Neuroethics
Research Unit, Department of Neurology and Neurosurgery, McGill
University, Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal, Montréal, QC.
eric.racine@ircm.qc.ca
Abstract
There
is a growing interest in various forms of naturalism in bioethics, but
there is a clear need for further clarification. In an effort to address
this situation, I present three epistemological stances:
anti-naturalism, strong naturalism, and moderate pragmatic naturalism. I
argue that the dominant paradigm within philosophical ethics has been a
form of anti-naturalism mainly supported by a strong 'is' and 'ought'
distinction. This fundamental epistemological commitment has contributed
to the estrangement of academic philosophical ethics from major social
problems and explains partially why, in the early 1980s, 'medicine saved
the life of ethics'. Rejection of anti-naturalism, however, is often
associated with strong forms of naturalism that commit the naturalistic
fallacy and threaten to reduce the normative dimensions of ethics to
biological imperatives. This move is rightly dismissed as a pitfall
since ethics is, in part, a struggle against the course of nature.
Rejection of naturalism has drawbacks, however, such as deterring
bioethicists from acknowledging the implicit naturalistic
epistemological commitments of bioethics. I argue that a moderate
pragmatic form of naturalism represents an epistemological position that
best embraces the tension of anti-naturalism and strong naturalism:
bioethics is neither disconnected from empirical knowledge nor
subjugated to it. The discussion is based upon historical writings in
philosophy and bioethics.
