a
Department of Philosophy, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon
b Department of Economics, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon
b Department of Economics, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon
Abstract
The exclusive use of
evolutionary explanations and game theory to justify moral claims has
led economists to an impasse. Our discussion of this problem is focused
on arguments made by Kenneth Binmore and Herbert Gintis, two vocal and
notable economists behind these efforts. We begin by pointing out the
false dilemma they present between ethical theories involving dubious
non-naturalist metaphysics and
their versions of naturalized game-theoretic ethics. We do so by, first,
discussing alternative naturalist accounts, namely, those of Peter
Railton and Richard Boyd. Second, we argue that their descriptive and
explanatory theories are in fact committed to substantive normative
claims. Our hypothesis is that their attempts to avoid ethical arguments
are responsible for their mistaken belief that theirs is a scientific
disagreement, whereas it is in fact one about human nature. Binmore and
Gintis’s disagreement about ethical claims requires acknowledging and
engaging with substantive normative arguments such as those of what is
good and what ought to be done. The alternative would be a never-ending
disagreement on the fundamental view of human nature. This path, we
worry, may be a road to nowhere. © 2016 The Association for Social
Economics
Author keywords
Economics; ethics; naturalized; realism; relativist
ISSN: 00346764Source Type: Journal
Original language: English
DOI: 10.1080/00346764.2016.1168034Document Type: Article in Press
Publisher: Routledge
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Mabsout, R.; Department of Economics, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon, ; email:rm95@aub.edu.lb
© Copyright 2016 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
© Copyright 2016 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
